Hi ZmnSCPxj,

Generalizing a bit this appears to be the same with one exception. The amount 
of encumbered coin is relevant to an external observer. Of course the effective 
dust limit is the maximum necessary encumbrance otherwise.

In the case of simple tracking, the market value of the coin is not relevant, 
all that is required is a valid output. Hence the devolution to 1 sat tracking. 
In your scenario the objective is to establish a meaningful cost for the output.

A community of people using this as a sort of hashcash spam protection can 
raise the amount of encumbered coin (i.e. advertising threshold price) required 
in that context. The cost of this encumberance includes not only at least one 
tx fee but market cost of the coin rental.

At a 1 year advertisement term, 10% APR capital cost, and threshold of 1 
encumbered coin, the same is achieved by burning .1 coin. In other words the 
renter (advertiser) has actually paid to the coin owner .1 coin to rent 1 coin 
for one year.

As with Bitcoin mining, it is the consumed cost that matters in this scenario, 
(i.e., not the hash rate, or in this case the encumbered coin face value). Why 
would the advertiser not simply be required to burn .1 coin for the same 
privilege, just as miners burn energy? Why would it not make more sense to 
spend that coin in support of the secondary network (e.g. paying for 
confirmation security), just as with the burning of energy in Bitcoin mining?

e

> On Jul 3, 2019, at 23:57, ZmnSCPxj <zmnsc...@protonmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Good morning Eric,
> 
> 
>>> and thanks to you and ZmnSCPxj we now have two additional uses cases for 
>>> UTXOs that are only temporarily accessible to their current owner.
>> 
>> Actually you have a single potentially-valid use case, the one I have 
>> presented. The others I have shown to be invalid (apart from scamming) and 
>> no additional information to demonstrate errors in my conclusions have been 
>> offered.
> 
> I presented another use case, that of the "Bitcoin Classified Ads Network".
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-July/017083.html
> 
> Advertisements are "backed" by an unspent TXO.
> In order to limit their local resource consumption, nodes of this network 
> will preferentially keep advertisements that are backed by higher UTXO values 
> divided by advertisement size, and drop those with too low UTXO value divided 
> by advertisement size.
> 
> Thus, spammers will either need to rent larger UTXO values for their spam, 
> paying for the higher rent involved, or fall back to pre-Bitcoin spamming 
> methods.
> Thus I think I have presented a use-case that is viable for this and does not 
> simply devolve to "just burn a 1-satoshi output".
> 
> I still do not quite support generalized covenants as the use-case is already 
> possible on current Bitcoin (and given that with just a little more 
> transaction introspection this enables Turing-completeness), but the basic 
> concept of "renting a UTXO of substantial value" appears sound to me.
> 
> 
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
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