Hi Mike,

There is no support for structured headers so far, for consistency reasons,
and there has been no movement to deprecate the "true" value for
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. The value of such a deprecation seems
minimal.

I could pretty easily add support for the structured "?1" value on top of
the "true" token for the new Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network header,
and specify that, but I'm not sure it would be terribly useful. Do you
think otherwise?

Cheers,
Titouan

On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 4:45 PM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> wrote:

> Hi Titouan,
>
> I'm curious what the plan is for structured headers.
> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/issues/45 is marked as
> blocked - has there been other progress or thinking behind the scenes?
>
> thanks,
> Mike
>
> On 11/29/21 10:36 AM, 'Titouan Rigoudy' via blink-dev wrote:
>
> Contact emails tito...@chromium.org, v...@chromium.org, cl...@chromium.org
>
> Explainer
> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/main/explainer.md
>
> Specification https://wicg.github.io/private-network-access/
>
> Design docs
>
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYPIeP90MQ_pQ6UAo0mCB3g2Z_AynfPWHbDnHIST6VI/edit
>
> Summary
>
> Sends a CORS preflight request ahead of any private network requests for
> subresources, asking for explicit permission from the target server. A
> private network request is any request from a public website to a private
> IP address or localhost, or from a private website (e.g. intranet) to
> localhost. Sending a preflight request mitigates the risk of cross-site
> request forgery attacks against private network devices such as routers,
> which are often not prepared to defend against this threat.
>
>
> Blink component Blink>SecurityFeature>CORS>PrivateNetworkAccess
> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3ESecurityFeature%3ECORS%3EPrivateNetworkAccess>
>
> TAG review https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/572
>
> TAG review status Pending
>
> Risks
>
>
> Interoperability and Compatibility
>
> The main interoperability risk, as always, is if other browser engines do
> not implement this. Compat risk is straightforward: web servers that do not
> handle the new preflight requests will eventually break, once the feature
> ships. The plan to address this is as follows: 1. Send preflight request,
> ignore result, always send actual request. Failed preflight requests will
> result in a warning being shown in devtools. 2. Wait for 3 milestones. 3.
> Gate actual request on preflight request success, with deprecation trial
> for developers to buy some more time. 4. End deprecation trial 4 milestones
> later. UseCounters:
> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3753
> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3755
> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3757 The
> above measure pages that make at least one private network request for
> which we would now send a preflight request.
>
>
> Gecko: Worth prototyping (
> https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/143)
>
> WebKit: No signal (
> https://lists.webkit.org/pipermail/webkit-dev/2021-November/032040.html)
> Pending response.
>
> Web developers: No signals Anecdotal evidence so far suggests that most
> web developers are OK with this new requirement, though some do not control
> the target endpoints and would be negatively impacted.
>
> Other signals:
>
> Ergonomics
>
> None.
>
>
> Activation
>
> Gating access to the private network overnight on preflight requests would
> likely result in widespread breakage. This is why the plan is to first send
> requests but not act on their result, giving server developers time to
> implement code handling these requests. Deprecation warnings will be
> surfaced in DevTools to alert web/client developers when the potential for
> breakage later on is detected. Enforcement will be turned on later (aiming
> for 3 milestones), along with a deprecation trial for impacted web
> developers to buy themselves some more time. Experience suggests a large
> fraction of developers will not notice the advance deprecation warnings
> until things break.
>
>
> Security
>
> This change aims to be security-positive, preventing CSRF attacks against
> soft and juicy targets such as router admin interfaces. DNS rebinding
> threats were of particular concern during the design of this feature:
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYPIeP90MQ_pQ6UAo0mCB3g2Z_AynfPWHbDnHIST6VI/edit#heading=h.189j5gnadts9
>
>
> Debuggability
>
> Relevant information (client and resource IP address space) is already
> piped into the DevTools network panel. Deprecation warnings and errors will
> be surfaced in the DevTools issues panel explaining the problem when it
> arises.
>
>
> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests
> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md>
> ? Yes
>
> DevTrial instructions
> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/main/HOWTO.md
>
> Flag name PrivateNetworkAccessRespectPreflightResults
>
> Requires code in //chrome? False
>
> Tracking bug https://crbug.com/591068
>
> Launch bug https://crbug.com/1274149
>
> Estimated milestones
> DevTrial on desktop 98
> DevTrial on android 98
>
> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status
> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5737414355058688
>
> Links to previous Intent discussions Intent to prototype:
> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/PrB0xnNxaHs/m/jeoxvNjXCAAJ
>
>
> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status
> <https://www.chromestatus.com/>.
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