I'm not sure it makes sense to introduce a structured header here, given that it's layering on top of CORS headers that I don't think there's substantial interest in changing.
-mike On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 4:55 PM 'Titouan Rigoudy' via blink-dev < blink-dev@chromium.org> wrote: > Hi Mike, > > There is no support for structured headers so far, for consistency > reasons, and there has been no movement to deprecate the "true" value for > Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. The value of such a deprecation seems > minimal. > > I could pretty easily add support for the structured "?1" value on top of > the "true" token for the new Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network header, > and specify that, but I'm not sure it would be terribly useful. Do you > think otherwise? > > Cheers, > Titouan > > On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 4:45 PM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> wrote: > >> Hi Titouan, >> >> I'm curious what the plan is for structured headers. >> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/issues/45 is marked as >> blocked - has there been other progress or thinking behind the scenes? >> >> thanks, >> Mike >> >> On 11/29/21 10:36 AM, 'Titouan Rigoudy' via blink-dev wrote: >> >> Contact emails tito...@chromium.org, v...@chromium.org, >> cl...@chromium.org >> >> Explainer >> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/main/explainer.md >> >> Specification https://wicg.github.io/private-network-access/ >> >> Design docs >> >> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYPIeP90MQ_pQ6UAo0mCB3g2Z_AynfPWHbDnHIST6VI/edit >> >> Summary >> >> Sends a CORS preflight request ahead of any private network requests for >> subresources, asking for explicit permission from the target server. A >> private network request is any request from a public website to a private >> IP address or localhost, or from a private website (e.g. intranet) to >> localhost. Sending a preflight request mitigates the risk of cross-site >> request forgery attacks against private network devices such as routers, >> which are often not prepared to defend against this threat. >> >> >> Blink component Blink>SecurityFeature>CORS>PrivateNetworkAccess >> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3ESecurityFeature%3ECORS%3EPrivateNetworkAccess> >> >> TAG review https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/572 >> >> TAG review status Pending >> >> Risks >> >> >> Interoperability and Compatibility >> >> The main interoperability risk, as always, is if other browser engines do >> not implement this. Compat risk is straightforward: web servers that do not >> handle the new preflight requests will eventually break, once the feature >> ships. The plan to address this is as follows: 1. Send preflight request, >> ignore result, always send actual request. Failed preflight requests will >> result in a warning being shown in devtools. 2. Wait for 3 milestones. 3. >> Gate actual request on preflight request success, with deprecation trial >> for developers to buy some more time. 4. End deprecation trial 4 milestones >> later. UseCounters: >> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3753 >> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3755 >> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3757 The >> above measure pages that make at least one private network request for >> which we would now send a preflight request. >> >> >> Gecko: Worth prototyping ( >> https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/143) >> >> WebKit: No signal ( >> https://lists.webkit.org/pipermail/webkit-dev/2021-November/032040.html) >> Pending response. >> >> Web developers: No signals Anecdotal evidence so far suggests that most >> web developers are OK with this new requirement, though some do not control >> the target endpoints and would be negatively impacted. >> >> Other signals: >> >> Ergonomics >> >> None. >> >> >> Activation >> >> Gating access to the private network overnight on preflight requests >> would likely result in widespread breakage. This is why the plan is to >> first send requests but not act on their result, giving server developers >> time to implement code handling these requests. Deprecation warnings will >> be surfaced in DevTools to alert web/client developers when the potential >> for breakage later on is detected. Enforcement will be turned on later >> (aiming for 3 milestones), along with a deprecation trial for impacted web >> developers to buy themselves some more time. Experience suggests a large >> fraction of developers will not notice the advance deprecation warnings >> until things break. >> >> >> Security >> >> This change aims to be security-positive, preventing CSRF attacks against >> soft and juicy targets such as router admin interfaces. DNS rebinding >> threats were of particular concern during the design of this feature: >> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYPIeP90MQ_pQ6UAo0mCB3g2Z_AynfPWHbDnHIST6VI/edit#heading=h.189j5gnadts9 >> >> >> Debuggability >> >> Relevant information (client and resource IP address space) is already >> piped into the DevTools network panel. Deprecation warnings and errors will >> be surfaced in the DevTools issues panel explaining the problem when it >> arises. >> >> >> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests >> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> >> ? Yes >> >> DevTrial instructions >> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/main/HOWTO.md >> >> Flag name PrivateNetworkAccessRespectPreflightResults >> >> Requires code in //chrome? False >> >> Tracking bug https://crbug.com/591068 >> >> Launch bug https://crbug.com/1274149 >> >> Estimated milestones >> DevTrial on desktop 98 >> DevTrial on android 98 >> >> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status >> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5737414355058688 >> >> Links to previous Intent discussions Intent to prototype: >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/PrB0xnNxaHs/m/jeoxvNjXCAAJ >> >> >> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status >> <https://www.chromestatus.com/>. >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "blink-dev" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAPATO9fdAK%2BnrTfUzug8ub_DhV_LE0b7XrgZ7j5%2Bj_BHtW-FXg%40mail.gmail.com >> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAPATO9fdAK%2BnrTfUzug8ub_DhV_LE0b7XrgZ7j5%2Bj_BHtW-FXg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "blink-dev" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAPATO9f3dAnHromxwvp8jWRxVLYVKZ0PAG5snX2KDFAYz4kc7Q%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAPATO9f3dAnHromxwvp8jWRxVLYVKZ0PAG5snX2KDFAYz4kc7Q%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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