"did the 6 day war play into that at all maybe?" Hell yes.
>From wikipedia: In Six Days of War, historian Michael Oren argues that the Arab leadership spread false claims about American involvement in order to secure Soviet support for the Arab side. In a 1993 interview for the Johnson Presidential Library<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon_Baines_Johnson_Library_and_Museum>oral history archives, U.S. Secretary of Defense<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Defense> Robert McNamara <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_McNamara> revealed that a carrier battle group <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_battle_group>, the U.S. 6th Fleet <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._6th_Fleet>, on a training exercise near Gibraltar <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibraltar> was re-positioned towards the eastern Mediterranean<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediterranean>to be able to defend Israel. The administration "thought the situation was so tense in Israel that perhaps the Syrians, fearing Israel would attack them, or the Russians supporting the Syrians might wish to redress the balance of power and might attack Israel". The Soviets learned of this deployment, which they regarded as offensive in nature, and, in a hotline message from Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexei_Kosygin>, threatened the United States with war. The Soviet Union supported its Arab allies.[185]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War#cite_note-184>In May 1967, the Soviets started a surge deployment of their naval forces into the East Mediterranean. Early in the crisis they began to shadow the US and British carriers with destroyers and intelligence collecting vessels. The Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean was sufficiently strong to act as a major restraint on the U.S. Navy.[186]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War#cite_note-185>In a 1983 interview with the *Boston Globe <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boston_Globe>*, McNamara said that "We damn near had war". He said Kosygin was angry that "we had turned around a carrier in the Mediterranean".[187]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War#cite_note-bg1983-186> And that crisis was minor compared to the Yom Kippur War. The potential conflict between the US and the USSR was even greater. The war began with a joint surprise attack on Yom Kippur<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur>, the holiest day in Judaism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judaism>, which coincided with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Egypt and Syria respectively crossed cease-fire lines to enter the Israeli-held Sinai Peninsula <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinai_Peninsula> and Golan Heights<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golan_Heights>, which had been captured and occupied since the 1967 Six-Day War<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War>. The conflict had all the elements of a severe international crisis, and ended with a near-confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers, the United States <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States> and the Soviet Union<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union> ,[22] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-21> both of whom launched massive resupply efforts to their allies during the war. In the meantime, Kissinger conducted a series of exchanges with the Egyptians, Israelis and the Soviets. On October 24 Sadat publicly appealed for American and Soviet contingents to oversee the cease-fire; it was quickly rejected in a White House statement. Kissinger also met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss convening a peace conference with Geneva as the venue. Later in the evening (9:35pm) of October 2425, Brezhnev sent Nixon a "very urgent" letter. In that letter, Brezhnev began by noting that Israel was continuing to violate the cease-fire and it posed a challenge to both the US and USSR. He stressed the need to "implement" the cease-fire resolution and "invited" the US to join the Soviets "to compel observance of the cease-fire without delay" He then threatened "I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider taking appropriate steps unilaterally <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unilateralism>. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel."[188]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-William_B_Quandt_p_121-187> [189] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-188> In short, the Soviets were threatening to intervene in the war on Egypt's side if they could not work together to enforce the cease-fire. Kissinger immediately passed the message to Haig, who met with Nixon for 20 minutes around 10:30 pm, and reportedly empowered Kissinger to take any necessary action.[188]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-William_B_Quandt_p_121-187>Kissinger immediately called a meeting of senior officials, including Defense Secretary <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Defense> James Schlesinger <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Schlesinger>, CIA Director<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Director_of_the_Central_Intelligence_Agency> William Colby <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Colby>, and White House Chief of Staff <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_House_Chief_of_Staff> Alexander Haig <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Haig>. The Watergate scandal<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watergate_scandal>had reached its apex, and Nixon was so agitated and discomposed that they decided to handle the matter without him: When Kissinger asked Haig whether [Nixon] should be wakened, the White House chief of staff replied firmly 'No.' Haig clearly shared Kissinger's feelings that Nixon was in no shape to make weighty decisions.[190]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-Rabinovich_3-189> The meeting produced a conciliatory response, which was sent (in Nixon's name) to Brezhnev. At the same time, it was decided to increase the Defense Condition <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_Condition> (DEFCON) from four to three. Lastly, they approved a message to Sadat (again, in Nixon's name) asking him to drop his request for Soviet assistance, and threatening that if the Soviets were to intervene, so would the United States.[190]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-Rabinovich_3-189> The Soviets placed seven airborne divisions on alert and an airlift was marshaled to transport them to the Middle East. An airborne command post was set up in the southern Soviet Union, and several air force units were also alerted. "Reports also indicated that at least one of the divisions and a squadron of transport planes had been moved from the Soviet Union to an airbase in Yugoslavia".[191]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-190>The Soviets also deployed seven amphibious warfare craft with some 40,000 naval infantry in the Mediterranean. The Soviets quickly detected the increased American defense condition, and were astonished and bewildered at the response. "Who could have imagined the Americans would be so easily frightened," said Nikolai Podgorny<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikolai_Podgorny>. "It is not reasonable to become engaged in a war with the United States because of Egypt and Syria," said Premier Alexei Kosygin<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexey_Kosygin>, while KGB chief Yuri Andropov <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuri_Andropov>added that "We shall not unleash the Third World War <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_III>."[192]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-191>The letter from the American cabinet arrived during the meeting. Brezhnev decided that the Americans were too nervous, and that the best course of action would be to wait to reply.[193]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-192>The next morning, the Egyptians agreed to the American suggestion, and dropped their request for assistance from the Soviets, bringing the crisis to an end. J - Experience hath shewn, that even under the best forms those entrusted with power have, in time, and by slow operations, perverted it into tyranny - Thomas Jefferson on government ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~| Order the Adobe Coldfusion Anthology now! http://www.amazon.com/Adobe-Coldfusion-Anthology-Michael-Dinowitz/dp/1430272155/?tag=houseoffusion Archive: http://www.houseoffusion.com/groups/cf-community/message.cfm/messageid:324372 Subscription: http://www.houseoffusion.com/groups/cf-community/subscribe.cfm Unsubscribe: http://www.houseoffusion.com/groups/cf-community/unsubscribe.cfm