"did the 6 day war play into that at all maybe?"

Hell yes.

>From wikipedia:

In Six Days of War, historian Michael Oren argues that the Arab leadership
spread false claims about American involvement in order to secure Soviet
support for the Arab side.

In a 1993 interview for the Johnson Presidential
Library<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon_Baines_Johnson_Library_and_Museum>oral
history archives, U.S.
Secretary of 
Defense<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Defense>
Robert
McNamara <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_McNamara> revealed that a carrier
battle group <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_battle_group>, the U.S.
6th Fleet <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._6th_Fleet>, on a training
exercise near Gibraltar <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibraltar> was
re-positioned towards the eastern
Mediterranean<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediterranean>to be able to
defend Israel. The administration "thought the situation was
so tense in Israel that perhaps the Syrians, fearing Israel would attack
them, or the Russians supporting the Syrians might wish to redress the
balance of power and might attack Israel". The Soviets learned of this
deployment, which they regarded as offensive in nature, and, in a hotline
message from Soviet Premier Alexei
Kosygin<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexei_Kosygin>,
threatened the United States with war.

The Soviet Union supported its Arab
allies.[185]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War#cite_note-184>In
May 1967, the Soviets started a surge deployment of their naval forces
into the East Mediterranean. Early in the crisis they began to shadow the US
and British carriers with destroyers and intelligence collecting vessels.
The Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean was sufficiently strong to
act as a major restraint on the U.S.
Navy.[186]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War#cite_note-185>In a
1983 interview with the
*Boston Globe <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boston_Globe>*, McNamara said
that "We damn near had war". He said Kosygin was angry that "we had turned
around a carrier in the
Mediterranean".[187]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War#cite_note-bg1983-186>


And that crisis was minor compared to the Yom Kippur War.  The potential
conflict between the US and the USSR was even greater.

The war began with a joint surprise attack on Yom
Kippur<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur>,
the holiest day in Judaism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judaism>, which
coincided with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Egypt and Syria
respectively crossed cease-fire lines to enter the Israeli-held Sinai
Peninsula <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinai_Peninsula> and Golan
Heights<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golan_Heights>,
which had been captured and occupied since the 1967 Six-Day
War<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War>.
The conflict had all the elements of a severe international crisis, and
ended with a near-confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers, the United
States <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States> and the Soviet
Union<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union>
,[22] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-21> both of
whom launched massive resupply efforts to their allies during the war.

In the meantime, Kissinger conducted a series of exchanges with the
Egyptians, Israelis and the Soviets. On October 24 Sadat publicly appealed
for American and Soviet contingents to oversee the cease-fire; it was
quickly rejected in a White House statement. Kissinger also met with Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss convening a peace conference with Geneva as
the venue. Later in the evening (9:35pm) of October 24–25, Brezhnev sent
Nixon a "very urgent" letter. In that letter, Brezhnev began by noting that
Israel was continuing to violate the cease-fire and it posed a challenge to
both the US and USSR. He stressed the need to "implement" the cease-fire
resolution and "invited" the US to join the Soviets "to compel observance of
the cease-fire without delay" He then threatened "I will say it straight
that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we
should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider taking appropriate
steps unilaterally <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unilateralism>. We cannot
allow arbitrariness on the part of
Israel."[188]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-William_B_Quandt_p_121-187>
[189] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-188> In short,
the Soviets were threatening to intervene in the war on Egypt's side if they
could not work together to enforce the cease-fire.

Kissinger immediately passed the message to Haig, who met with Nixon for 20
minutes around 10:30 pm, and reportedly empowered Kissinger to take any
necessary 
action.[188]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-William_B_Quandt_p_121-187>Kissinger
immediately called a meeting of senior officials, including Defense
Secretary <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Defense>
James
Schlesinger <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Schlesinger>, CIA
Director<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Director_of_the_Central_Intelligence_Agency>
William
Colby <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Colby>, and White House Chief of
Staff <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_House_Chief_of_Staff> Alexander
Haig <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Haig>. The Watergate
scandal<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watergate_scandal>had reached its
apex, and Nixon was so agitated and discomposed that they
decided to handle the matter without him:

When Kissinger asked Haig whether [Nixon] should be wakened, the White House
chief of staff replied firmly 'No.' Haig clearly shared Kissinger's feelings
that Nixon was in no shape to make weighty
decisions.[190]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-Rabinovich_3-189>

The meeting produced a conciliatory response, which was sent (in Nixon's
name) to Brezhnev. At the same time, it was decided to increase the Defense
Condition <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_Condition> (DEFCON) from
four to three. Lastly, they approved a message to Sadat (again, in Nixon's
name) asking him to drop his request for Soviet assistance, and threatening
that if the Soviets were to intervene, so would the United
States.[190]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-Rabinovich_3-189>

The Soviets placed seven airborne divisions on alert and an airlift was
marshaled to transport them to the Middle East. An airborne command post was
set up in the southern Soviet Union, and several air force units were also
alerted. "Reports also indicated that at least one of the divisions and a
squadron of transport planes had been moved from the Soviet Union to an
airbase in 
Yugoslavia".[191]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-190>The
Soviets also deployed seven amphibious warfare craft with some 40,000
naval infantry in the Mediterranean.

The Soviets quickly detected the increased American defense condition, and
were astonished and bewildered at the response. "Who could have imagined the
Americans would be so easily frightened," said Nikolai
Podgorny<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikolai_Podgorny>.
"It is not reasonable to become engaged in a war with the United States
because of Egypt and Syria," said Premier Alexei
Kosygin<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexey_Kosygin>,
while KGB chief Yuri Andropov
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuri_Andropov>added that "We shall not
unleash the Third
World War 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_III>."[192]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-191>The
letter from the American cabinet arrived during the meeting. Brezhnev
decided that the Americans were too nervous, and that the best course of
action would be to wait to
reply.[193]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-192>The
next morning, the Egyptians agreed to the American suggestion, and
dropped their request for assistance from the Soviets, bringing the crisis
to an end.


J

-

Experience hath shewn, that even under the best forms those entrusted with
power have, in time, and by slow operations, perverted it into tyranny -
Thomas Jefferson on government

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~|
Order the Adobe Coldfusion Anthology now!
http://www.amazon.com/Adobe-Coldfusion-Anthology-Michael-Dinowitz/dp/1430272155/?tag=houseoffusion
Archive: 
http://www.houseoffusion.com/groups/cf-community/message.cfm/messageid:324372
Subscription: http://www.houseoffusion.com/groups/cf-community/subscribe.cfm
Unsubscribe: http://www.houseoffusion.com/groups/cf-community/unsubscribe.cfm

Reply via email to