I can never tell if it's a sad testament to our ultimate aim to destroy ourselves that we seem to so often bring ourselves right to the brink of annihilation..........or a terrific testimony to our basic common sense that given so many opportunities to "push the button" on our mutual destruction, we have always chosen to survive???
Probably a bit of both. On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 9:34 AM, Jerry Barnes <critic...@gmail.com> wrote: > > "did the 6 day war play into that at all maybe?" > > Hell yes. > > From wikipedia: > > In Six Days of War, historian Michael Oren argues that the Arab leadership > spread false claims about American involvement in order to secure Soviet > support for the Arab side. > > In a 1993 interview for the Johnson Presidential > Library< > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon_Baines_Johnson_Library_and_Museum>oral > history archives, U.S. > Secretary of Defense< > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Defense> > Robert > McNamara <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_McNamara> revealed that a > carrier > battle group <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_battle_group>, the U.S. > 6th Fleet <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._6th_Fleet>, on a training > exercise near Gibraltar <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibraltar> was > re-positioned towards the eastern > Mediterranean<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediterranean>to be able to > defend Israel. The administration "thought the situation was > so tense in Israel that perhaps the Syrians, fearing Israel would attack > them, or the Russians supporting the Syrians might wish to redress the > balance of power and might attack Israel". The Soviets learned of this > deployment, which they regarded as offensive in nature, and, in a hotline > message from Soviet Premier Alexei > Kosygin<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexei_Kosygin>, > threatened the United States with war. > > The Soviet Union supported its Arab > allies.[185]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War#cite_note-184>In > May 1967, the Soviets started a surge deployment of their naval forces > into the East Mediterranean. Early in the crisis they began to shadow the > US > and British carriers with destroyers and intelligence collecting vessels. > The Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean was sufficiently strong to > act as a major restraint on the U.S. > Navy.[186]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War#cite_note-185>In a > 1983 interview with the > *Boston Globe <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boston_Globe>*, McNamara said > that "We damn near had war". He said Kosygin was angry that "we had turned > around a carrier in the > Mediterranean".[187]< > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War#cite_note-bg1983-186> > > > And that crisis was minor compared to the Yom Kippur War. The potential > conflict between the US and the USSR was even greater. > > The war began with a joint surprise attack on Yom > Kippur<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur>, > the holiest day in Judaism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judaism>, which > coincided with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Egypt and Syria > respectively crossed cease-fire lines to enter the Israeli-held Sinai > Peninsula <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinai_Peninsula> and Golan > Heights<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golan_Heights>, > which had been captured and occupied since the 1967 Six-Day > War<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War>. > The conflict had all the elements of a severe international crisis, and > ended with a near-confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers, the > United > States <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States> and the Soviet > Union<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union> > ,[22] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-21> both of > whom launched massive resupply efforts to their allies during the war. > > In the meantime, Kissinger conducted a series of exchanges with the > Egyptians, Israelis and the Soviets. On October 24 Sadat publicly appealed > for American and Soviet contingents to oversee the cease-fire; it was > quickly rejected in a White House statement. Kissinger also met with Soviet > Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss convening a peace conference with Geneva as > the venue. Later in the evening (9:35pm) of October 2425, Brezhnev sent > Nixon a "very urgent" letter. In that letter, Brezhnev began by noting that > Israel was continuing to violate the cease-fire and it posed a challenge to > both the US and USSR. He stressed the need to "implement" the cease-fire > resolution and "invited" the US to join the Soviets "to compel observance > of > the cease-fire without delay" He then threatened "I will say it straight > that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we > should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider taking appropriate > steps unilaterally <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unilateralism>. We cannot > allow arbitrariness on the part of > Israel."[188]< > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-William_B_Quandt_p_121-187 > > > [189] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-188> In > short, > the Soviets were threatening to intervene in the war on Egypt's side if > they > could not work together to enforce the cease-fire. > > Kissinger immediately passed the message to Haig, who met with Nixon for 20 > minutes around 10:30 pm, and reportedly empowered Kissinger to take any > necessary action.[188]< > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-William_B_Quandt_p_121-187 > >Kissinger > immediately called a meeting of senior officials, including Defense > Secretary <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Defense > > > James > Schlesinger <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Schlesinger>, CIA > Director< > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Director_of_the_Central_Intelligence_Agency> > William > Colby <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Colby>, and White House Chief > of > Staff <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_House_Chief_of_Staff> Alexander > Haig <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Haig>. The Watergate > scandal<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watergate_scandal>had reached its > apex, and Nixon was so agitated and discomposed that they > decided to handle the matter without him: > > When Kissinger asked Haig whether [Nixon] should be wakened, the White > House > chief of staff replied firmly 'No.' Haig clearly shared Kissinger's > feelings > that Nixon was in no shape to make weighty > decisions.[190]< > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-Rabinovich_3-189> > > The meeting produced a conciliatory response, which was sent (in Nixon's > name) to Brezhnev. At the same time, it was decided to increase the Defense > Condition <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_Condition> (DEFCON) from > four to three. Lastly, they approved a message to Sadat (again, in Nixon's > name) asking him to drop his request for Soviet assistance, and threatening > that if the Soviets were to intervene, so would the United > States.[190]< > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-Rabinovich_3-189> > > The Soviets placed seven airborne divisions on alert and an airlift was > marshaled to transport them to the Middle East. An airborne command post > was > set up in the southern Soviet Union, and several air force units were also > alerted. "Reports also indicated that at least one of the divisions and a > squadron of transport planes had been moved from the Soviet Union to an > airbase in Yugoslavia".[191]< > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-190>The > Soviets also deployed seven amphibious warfare craft with some 40,000 > naval infantry in the Mediterranean. > > The Soviets quickly detected the increased American defense condition, and > were astonished and bewildered at the response. "Who could have imagined > the > Americans would be so easily frightened," said Nikolai > Podgorny<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikolai_Podgorny>. > "It is not reasonable to become engaged in a war with the United States > because of Egypt and Syria," said Premier Alexei > Kosygin<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexey_Kosygin>, > while KGB chief Yuri Andropov > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuri_Andropov>added that "We shall not > unleash the Third > World War <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_III>."[192]< > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-191>The > letter from the American cabinet arrived during the meeting. Brezhnev > decided that the Americans were too nervous, and that the best course of > action would be to wait to > reply.[193]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#cite_note-192>The > next morning, the Egyptians agreed to the American suggestion, and > dropped their request for assistance from the Soviets, bringing the crisis > to an end. > > > J > > - > > Experience hath shewn, that even under the best forms those entrusted with > power have, in time, and by slow operations, perverted it into tyranny - > Thomas Jefferson on government > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~| Order the Adobe Coldfusion Anthology now! http://www.amazon.com/Adobe-Coldfusion-Anthology-Michael-Dinowitz/dp/1430272155/?tag=houseoffusion Archive: http://www.houseoffusion.com/groups/cf-community/message.cfm/messageid:324374 Subscription: http://www.houseoffusion.com/groups/cf-community/subscribe.cfm Unsubscribe: http://www.houseoffusion.com/groups/cf-community/unsubscribe.cfm
