Hi Tony,
Thank you for your comments.
We've deleted Section 4 due to the conclusion that the only practically
possible attacks are the ones caused by CGAs themselves. There are
other, theoretically possible attacks, that may be launched once in a
future when the one-way property of hash functions will be severely
affected. Even though we came up with few solutions and their analysis
about providing the hash agility for SEND, we decided to remove that
section because our analysis showed that there are no attacks that can
be launched now or in the near future (i.e. as long as we are dealing
"only" with affected collision property and not one-way hash property).
Ana
Tony Cheneau wrote:
Hello Ana, Suresh and Sheng,
I read your document and noted the following typos:
Section 3:
theaforementioned => the aforementioned
Section 5:
"the attacks against hash functions hash attacks" => "the attacks
against hash functions"
Also, I see that section 4 from the -09 version has been removed
("Support for the hash agility in SEND"). I read the IESG evaluation
record and I fail to see why this part was removed. Could you detail
this decision ? IMHO, this section was especially important because
RFC 4982 only describes CGA related issues and not SEND issues.
Regards,
Tony
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