All,
    I was doing my usual reading of the nanog mailing list and came across
one
of the more recent threads - "Routing Protocol Security".
What I found interesting was the name of the original poster, which noted,
Jeff Doyle!  Now, I'm sure there are quite a number of "Jeff Doyle's"
on the planet, however this name does mean a lot to those of us who has had
the privilege of owning Routing TCP/IP.

Basically, I thought folks on the list would be interested in the question as
it relates to the possible global affects based on current Internet routing
policies, or lack thereof on "Private-to-Private",  IXP peering or external
peering in general.

As a side note after reading the recently presented paper(nanog0202 mtg) "ISP
Essentials Supp" by Barry Raveendran Greene and Philip Smith,
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0206/ppt/barry.pdf  I must say that BGPv4, the
protocol has made great strides in it's operational enhancements.
Possible vulnerabilities like the one noted in rfc1948, or the points raised
by Tim Newsham's paper called "The Problem With Random Increments"
are for the most part no longer valid/relevant possibilities.

Furthermore, with the implementation of MD5 support and the possibility of
BGP
over IPSec the future looks bright for the security of global routing. Of
course with the growing use of mostly layer 2 peering(between IXP peers) and
MPLS/VPNs the need to implement even greater security within
BGP the protocol itself might become a NON-issue.

Thoughts anyone

Nigel


>HI,

>Can any of you cite cases where an attack has been carried out against a
network's routing protocol (BGP or OSPF in particular)? My apologies if this
question is too >far off-topic, but if anyone knows of such incidents it
would
be the members of this group.

 >Jeff Doyle




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