Thierry Moreau <thierry.mor...@connotech.com> writes: >The Bleichenbacher attack adaptation to OAEP is non-existent today and would >be an even more significant academic result. I must assume that >Bleichenbacher would have published results in this direction if his research >would have given those.
Bleichenbacher didn't, but Manger did more than a decade ago: However, the design of RSAES-OAEP makes it highly likely that implementations will leak information between the decryption and integrity check operations making them susceptible to a chosen ciphertext attack that requires many orders of magnitude less effort than similar attacks against PKCS #1 v1.5 block type 2 padding. -- "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1 v2.0" Peter. _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography