I think compromising microcode update signing keys would be the easiest path. Then you don't need backdoors baked in the hardware, don't need Intel's buy-in, and can target specific systems without impacting the public at large.
This is a pretty interesting analysis showing that these updates are 2048-bit RSA signed blobs: http://inertiawar.com/microcode/ On Fri, Jul 12, 2013 at 1:38 PM, Nico Williams <n...@cryptonector.com>wrote: > > I'd like to understand what attacks NSA and friends could mount, with > Intel's witting or unwitting cooperation, particularly what attacks > that *wouldn't* put civilian (and military!) infrastructure at risk > should details of a backdoor leak to the public, or *worse*, be stolen > by an antagonist.
_______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
