On 2013-07-13 3:43 PM, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote:
On Sat, Jul 13, 2013 at 1:38 AM, William Yager <will.ya...@gmail.com <mailto:will.ya...@gmail.com>> wrote:not trusting your hardware is a great place to start.Heh, might as well just give up. http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html(I know what you meant, just couldn't resist.) On Fri, Jul 12, 2013 at 7:20 PM, Peter Gutmann <pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz <mailto:pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz>> wrote: Nico Williams <n...@cryptonector.com <mailto:n...@cryptonector.com>> writes: >I'd like to understand what attacks NSA and friends could mount, with Intel's >witting or unwitting cooperation, particularly what attacks that *wouldn't* >put civilian (and military!) infrastructure at risk should details of a >backdoor leak to the public, or *worse*, be stolen by an antagonist. Right. How exactly would you backdoor an RNG so (a) it could be effectively used by the NSA when they needed it (e.g. to recover Tor keys), (b) not affect the security of massive amounts of infrastructure, and (c) be so totally undetectable that there'd be no risk of it causing a s**tstorm that makes the $0.5B FDIV bug seem like small change
Arrange that a certain specific sequence of data operations, which can be triggered by processing an incoming packet, switches the random number generator from true random mode to pseudo random mode based on a key found in that data.
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