the logical choice, as absurd as it may seem, is actually 3. allow for
the occassional terrorist success.
because, empirically, it works that way. it does happen from to time
even with all our current measures. and, intuitively, the high level
surveillance doesn't catch these ppl anyway. these are people who
really really don't want to be found. ex. heightened airport security
hasn't caught terrorists. lots of petty thieves and money launderers.
but, no terrorists.
On 12/1/2015 12:19 AM, d...@geer.org wrote:
In dealing with high level decision makers, the best strategy is
always to provide three options and have the decision maker choose
amongst them. Taking the American electorate as that high level
decision maker, I would find it refreshing were Brennan to present
said electorate with the choice between [1] content analysis (hence
crypto side doors and the exposure of content), [2] traffic analysis
(hence data retention at a level heretofore unseen and the cataloged
exposure of real social networks), and [3] a willing resolve to tolerate
the occasional terrorist success. It is a choice amongst losses.
--dan
_______________________________________________
cryptography mailing list
cryptography@randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
_______________________________________________
cryptography mailing list
cryptography@randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
