> Francois Grieu[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Peter Trei wrote: > > > I'd prefer that the printed receipt be retained at the polling > > station, after the voter has had an opportunity to examine it. > > This serves two purposes: First, it prevents the vote selling > > described above, and second, if a recount is required, it allows > > the recount to be done on the basis of a trustworthy record, > > already certified by the voter as accurate. > > Then there is the problem that the printed receipt must not be usable > to determine who voted for who, even knowing in which order the > voters went to the machine. Therefore the printed receipts must be > shuffled. Which brings us straight back to papers in a box, that we > shake before opening. > > Every way I look at it, electronic voting has a hard time to match > the resilience to abuse of the traditional > bulletin-in-an-enveloppe-in-a-box. > > Francois Grieu > I absolutely agree. Here in the US, where voters often have to make over a dozen choices each time they vote, the value of automating the process is significant. But it *must* be done in a way which increases voter confidence in the result.
Ballot boxes are also subject to many forms of fraud. But a dual system (electronic backed up by paper) is more resistant to attack then either alone. Peter --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
