David wrote: > AARG! Anonymous wrote: > >His description of how the Document Revocation List could work is > >interesting as well. Basically you would have to connect to > a server > >every time you wanted to read a document, in order to > download a key to > >unlock it. Then if "someone" decided that the document needed to > >un-exist, they would arrange for the server no longer to > download that > >key, and the document would effectively be deleted, everywhere. > > Well, sure. It's certainly how I had always envisioned one > might build a secure Document Revocation List using TCPA or > Palladium. I didn't realize this sort of thing would need > explaining; I assumed it would be obvious to cypherpunk > types. But I'm glad this risk is now clear.
To ensure priority for my Monday filings, I must point out at this time that while AARG and David's methods of implementing a DRL are certainly feasible, I believe a preferred method of implementing a DRL would be to utilize features offered by an infrastructure, such as Palladium, that supports time-limited documents: rather than requiring online access whenever the document is attempted to be displayed, the document's display permissions would be renewed periodically. If the display software misses one or more updates, the document display software will cease to display the document. BTW, does anybody here know if there is still an email time stamping server in operation? The references that I found to such servers appear to be dead. Thanks, --Lucky
