Dec. 9
AMERICAS:
Protecting the right to life against the Death Penalty
Written observations to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on
Legislative or Other Measures Denying Judicial or Other Effective Recourse
to Challenge the Death Penalty
In the Matter of a Request by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights for an Advisory Opinion from the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (Article 64(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights) And in
the Matter of Legislative Measures Concerning the Mandatory Imposition of
The Death Penalty And Related Matters
I. INTRODUCTION
1. On 8 December 2004, Amnesty International(1) lodged written
observations, as a party interested in the subject matter of this request
for an Advisory Opinion.
2. Amnesty International Ltd (Amnesty International), 1 Easton Street,
London, WC1X ODW, United Kingdom, is a company limited by guarantee.
Amnesty International is a worldwide movement of people who campaign for
internationally recognized human rights. Amnesty International is
independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or
religion. It does not support or oppose any government or political
system, nor does it support or oppose the views of the victims whose
rights it seeks to protect. It is concerned solely with the impartial
protection of human rights. Amnesty International has a varied network of
members and supporters around the world. At the latest count, there were
more than 1.8 million members, supporters and subscribers in over 150
countries and territories in every region of the world. Amnesty
International is a democratic, self-governing movement. Major policy
decisions are taken by an International Council made up of representatives
from all national sections.
3. Amnesty International has extensive experience in submitting amicus
curiae briefs and other third-party submissions in international and
national courts to assist them in resolving fundamental questions of
international law. For example it has intervened before the European Court
of Human Rights, in a number of cases(2) and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights.(3) In addition it has made a number of submissions to
national courts, including the UK House of Lords(4) and the US Supreme
Court. Amnesty International submits that it is thus well placed to assist
the Court with a wider international perspective.
II. THE COMMISSION'S REQUEST
1. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ('the Commission) has
requested an advisory opinion from the Court, pursuant to Article 64(1) of
the American Convention on Human Rights ('the Convention'). The Commission
has asked the Court to consider the following questions:
(1) Do Articles 25, 2 and 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights,
interpreted in accordance with Article 29 of the Convention, and in
relation to Articles 4, 5 and 8 of the American Convention, prohibit a
state from amending its constitution to prevent its domestic courts from
finding that the imposition or execution of a death sentence on a person
is inconsistent with or in contravention of fundamental rights under the
constitution because the death penalty is the mandatory punishment for the
person's crime?
(2) Do Articles 25, 2 and 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights,
interpreted in accordance with Article 29 of the Convention, and in
relation to Article 5 of the American Convention, prohibit a state from
amending its constitution to prevent its domestic courts from finding that
the imposition or execution of a death sentence on a person is
inconsistent with or in contravention of fundamental rights under the
constitution because the person sentenced to death has been detained under
conditions that constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment?
(3) Do Articles 25, 2 and 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights,
interpreted in accordance with Article 29 of the Convention, prohibit a
state from amending its constitution to prevent its domestic courts from
finding that the imposition or execution of a death sentence on a person
is inconsistent with or in contravention of fundamental rights under the
constitution because that person has a complaint pending before the
inter-American human rights system?
III. SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS OF INTERESTED PARTY
2. Amnesty International submits that:
(1) Each of the Commission's three questions should be answered in the
affirmative. Each of the hypothetical constitutional amendments set out by
the Commission involves violations of the Convention.
(2) Following the decision of the Court in Hilaire, Constantine and
Benjamin et al v Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of 21 June 2002, Ser. C No.
94 (2002), it is settled law that the imposition or execution of a
mandatory penalty of death in any circumstances violates the Convention,
inter alia because it is arbitrary, inhuman and degrading.
(3) States parties to the Convention are under an obligation not to
inflict inhuman and degrading treatment on those within their
jurisdiction, whether by the imposition of a mandatory penalty of death or
by the holding of a person in inhuman and degrading conditions of
detention, or a combination of these factors.
(4) The requirements of the Convention can restrict the extent to which
states are permitted, under international law, to alter their
constitutions. Such amendments will be impermissible under the Convention
if, inter alia, they impede the right of effective redress for violations
of constitutional or Convention rights.
(5) The requirement of effective redress includes the right to petition a
domestic court for relief, as well as, in the case of states which
recognise the right of individual petition, the right to bring an
application under the Inter-American system, and the right not to be
executed while such an application is pending.
3. The Commission's request is for an advisory opinion on the
compatibility with the Convention of certain hypothetical constitutional
amendments. The Commission has cited actual legislation, for example that
of Barbados, as examples of the kind of legislation in issue, but has
expressly stated that it does not seek a ruling on any particular case.
Accordingly, these submissions consider the Commission's questions in the
abstract and not by reference to any actual legislation or any specific
state party to the Convention.
IV. SUBMISSIONS
(1) Relevant provisions of the Convention
4. Article 1(1) of the Convention states that:
'The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and
freedoms recognised herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their
jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms,
without any discrimination for reasons of race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic
status, birth, or any other social condition.'
5. Article 2 states that:
'Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in
Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the
States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional
processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other
measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.'
6. Article 4 states that:
'(1) Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right
shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
(2) In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes and pursuant to a final judgment
rendered by a competent court and in accordance with a law establishing
such punishment, enacted prior to the commission of the crime. The
application of such punishment shall not be extended to crimes to which it
does not presently apply.
[...]
(6) Every person condemned to death shall have the right to apply for
amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be granted in all
cases. Capital punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is
pending decision by the competent authority.'
7. Article 5 states that:
'(1) Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral
integrity respected.
(2) No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty
shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person.
[...]'
8. Article 8 states that:
'(1) Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and
within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial
tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any
accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination
of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other
nature.
[...]'
9. Article 25 states that:
'(1) Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other
effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection
against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognised by the
constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even
though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the
course of their official duties.
(2) The States Parties undertake:
(a) to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights
determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of
the state;
(b) to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and
(c) to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted.'
10. Article 29 states that:
'No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as:
(a) permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment
or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised in this Convention or to
restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein;
(b) restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom
recognised by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of
another convention to which one of the said states is a party;
(c) precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human
personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of
government; or
(d) excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature
shall have.'
(2) The imposition or execution of a mandatory sentence of death in any
circumstances violates the Convention
11. In Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al v Trinidad and Tobago,
Judgment of 21 June 2002, Ser. C No. 94 (2002) this honourable Court
considered a Trinidad statute the Offences Against the Person Act 1925
which required the imposition of a mandatory sentence of death on all
those convicted of murder. The Court found, unanimously, that this
statute: 'automatically and generically mandates the application of the
death penalty for murder and disregards the fact that murder may have
varying degrees of seriousness. Consequently, this Act prevents the judge
from considering the basic circumstances in establishing the degree of
culpability and individualising the sentence since it compels the
indiscriminate imposition of the same punishment for conduct that can be
vastly different. In light of Article 4 of the American Convention, this
is exceptionally grave, as it puts at risk the most cherished possession,
namely, human life, and is arbitrary according to the terms of Article
4(1) of the Convention.' (at [103])
12. The Court went on to conclude that:
'because the Offences Against the Person Act submits all persons charged
with murder to a judicial process in which the individual circumstances of
the accused and the crime are not considered, the aforementioned Act
violates the prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation of life, in
contravention of Article 4(1) and 4(2) of the Convention.' (at [108])
13. The Court also found that the continued existence of the Offences
Against the Person Act 1925 constituted a violation of Article 2 of the
Convention. (at [117]). In reaching this conclusion, the Court drew on the
jurisprudence of other international human rights tribunals and supreme
courts, all of whom have found the mandatory death penalty to be arbitrary
and/or inhuman punishment.
(3) Hilaire appliesto the present request for an Advisory Opinion
14. While this Court's decision in Hilaire was directly binding only on
the state party concerned - Trinidad and Tobago - it constitutes an
authoritative interpretation of the meaning of the Convention, and in
particular the requirements of Article 4. The effect of the Court's
judgment is to demonstrate that Article 4 of the Convention prohibits
states parties from maintaining in force legislation requiring the penalty
of death to be imposed in every case of murder regardless of its specific
characteristics. There were no special features of the Trinidad and Tobago
legislation at issue in that case which would confine the effect of the
Court's judgment to that jurisdiction. The mandatory penalty of death
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life which must be taken to
violate Article 4 of the Convention in all circumstances.
15. This conclusion has implications for the obligation imposed on states
parties by Article 1(1) of the Convention, in which the parties 'undertake
to respect the rights and freedoms recognised' by the Convention. The
Convention is a living and developing text, and the rights and freedoms it
recognises include the Court's authoritative interpretations of the text.
This includes, now, the interpretation of Article 4 as precluding the
imposition or execution of a mandatory penalty of death. This conclusion
is reinforced by Article 29, which prohibits states parties from
restricting rights to a greater extent than is provided for in the
Convention.
16. Amnesty International submits that there is nothing in the request for
an Advisory Opinion which would require the Court's conclusion on the
mandatory death penalty to be re-opened. Rather, the Hilaire judgment
forms a starting point for analysis of the three questions posed by the
Commission.
(4) The obligations imposed on states parties by the finding that the
mandatory death penalty violates the Convention
17. The key provision in this analysis is Article 25. This guarantees the
right to 'simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse' to
a competent tribunal in cases of violation of an individual's rights under
the constitution of a state party, its other laws, or the rights enshrined
in the Convention. Consistent with the aim of ensuring that human rights
are protected at the domestic level, Article 25(2) imposes a direct
obligation on states parties to ensure that any individual who claims that
his constitutional and/or Convention rights have been violated 'shall have
his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the state.' Article 25 clearly envisages that domestic courts
and tribunals should be the primary source of redress for such violations.
18. The result of the Court's clear and unqualified judgment in Hilaire is
that any individual on whom a mandatory sentence of death is imposed
suffers a violation of his Convention rights. He or she may also suffer a
violation of his or her rights under the constitution of the state party
whose authorities posed the sentence. This is not necessarily the case:
for example, the constitutions of a number of states parties contain
clauses immunising from scrutiny certain legislation which predates the
constitution. The effect of such clauses in the Constitutions of Barbados,
Trinindad and Tobago and Jamaica has recently been considered by the Privy
Council.(5) The question of interpretation of specific constitutions is
not directly relevant to the current request for an Advisory Opinion,
firstly since the Court is not asked to deal with the legal provisions of
any specific state party, and secondly since Article 25(2) in any event
provides a right to effective redress in cases of violation of the rights
protected by the Convention, regardless of the content of constitutions
and of domestic law.
19. For the reasons given in the previous section, Amnesty International
submits that it is now settled law that the imposition of a mandatory
penalty of death in any case involves a violation of the Convention, and
in particular Article 4. The Commission has found the mandatory penalty to
violate other provisions of the Convention, but for present purposes
Amnesty International takes as a starting point the proposition that the
imposition or execution of a mandatory penalty violates at least Article 4
of the Convention.
20. The fact that the mandatory penalty violates the Convention imposes
obligations on states parties. These flow from the requirements of
Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention. States parties must 'respect', and
must 'give effect' to the rights contained in the Convention. Those rights
have now been authoritatively interpreted so as to preclude the imposition
of the mandatory penalty in any circumstances. Accordingly, any state
party which maintained in force such legislation would be failing to
ensure, inter alia, respect for the right not to be arbitrarily deprived
of life. The very existence of such legislation would trigger the
obligation in Article 2 to take legislative measures to bring the state
party's legal system into conformity with the full requirements of the
Convention.
21. The most appropriate means of doing so would be to repeal the relevant
legislation. This would ensure that no such penalties were imposed and
thus prevent violations of the Convention rights from occurring. In such a
case, the issue of effective remedies, and the questions posed by the
Commission, would not arise. Repeal of the relevant legislation was the
first form of reparation ordered by the Court in the Hilaire case:
'the State of Trinidad and Tobago should refrain from future application
of the [Offences Against the Person Act], and, within a reasonable time,
bring the law into compliance with the American Convention and other
international human rights norms, in accordance with Article 2, so that
the respect and enjoyment of the rights to life, personal integrity, a
fair trial and due process embodied in the Convention are guaranteed. The
legislative reforms contemplated should include the introduction of
different categories (criminal classes) of murder, in keeping with the
wide range of differences in the gravity of the act, so as to take into
account the particular circumstances of both the crime and the offender. A
system of graduated levels should be introduced to ensure that the
severity of the punishment is commensurate with the gravity of the act and
the criminal culpability of the accused.' (at [212])
(5) If the mandatory death penalty is maintained in force, and if this
gives rise to an arguable violation of the constitution of a state party,
the domestic courts must have jurisdiction to rule on the issue
22. For the reasons given above, states parties must repeal any
legislation requiring a mandatory penalty of death, in order to respect
and give effect to the Convention rights as currently interpreted.
However, if a state party should chose not to repeal such legislation, the
question of effective remedies would become a live issue. Each of the
Commission's questions presupposes that a state party has maintained the
mandatory death penalty. This would in itself be a violation of the
Convention; the three questions posed by the Commission require the Court
to examine the extent to which each of the three legislative amendments
would put a state party in further breach of the Convention.
23. The first of the Commission's questions asks the Court to consider a
situation where the domestic courts of a state party are precluded from
holding the imposition of a mandatory death penalty to violate the
constitution of that state party, not the Convention itself. It is
absolutely clear from the text of Article 25 that to deny redress under
the domestic constitution for violations of constitutional rights is to
breach Article 25. That Article does not prescribe any specific content
for a national constitution, but it does mean that the available remedies
must mirror the available rights. If a state party had a constitution
which prohibited, for example, arbitrary, inhuman or degrading treatment,
then that state party would, without more, violate Article 25 if it passed
legislation barring any category of person from arguing that treatment
imposed on them violated those constitutional rights.
24. Further, if the state party did not have a constitution or other
domestic law which prevented such treatment, this may in itself violate
article 25, when read with Article 2, since those subject to such
treatment may be unable to find a legal basis on which to seek redress.
This is not necessarily the case, since a state party may be able to
ensure effective redress by recognising the direct effect of the
Convention without enshrining the Convention rights in specific
legislation. This would depend on the constitutional arrangements of the
state party concerned.
(6) The relevance of conditions of detention
25. If a person was held in inhuman and degrading conditions, in a state
party where the constitution protected against inhuman and degrading
treatment, then the above analysis would apply: any constitutional
amendment which prevented them from enforcing their constitutional rights
before the domestic courts would violate Article 25 of the Convention.
26. The Commission's second question raises a more specific issue, namely
whether a state party would violate the Convention by amending the
constitution to prohibit those who have been sentenced to a mandatory
sentence of death from arguing that they should not be executed because
they had been held in cruel, inhuman or degrading conditions which
violated the constitution.
27. The analysis in the previous section showed that the Convention
requires states parties to make not only the Convention rights, but the
rights in their own constitutions and other laws, properly enforceable. In
the case of constitutional rights, the only way of doing so is to ensure
the jurisdiction of domestic courts or tribunals over such complaints. It
follows, therefore, that the Convention requires that mandatory death
sentence prisoners who are held in cruel, inhuman or degrading conditions
of detention, in states where such conditions are forbidden by the
constitution be able to raise that issue in the domestic courts. Further,
when Article 25 is read with Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention, this
shows that states are under a further obligation to ensure that their laws
do indeed prohibit the imposition of such conditions.
28. It does not follow from this simple textual analysis of the Convention
that such prisoners must have the right to argue for a specific remedy for
the constitutional violation, namely that they not be executed. The
Commission's question requires consideration this further issue in light
of the case-law of the Court.
29. The Court has recognised that there is a connection between the
imposition of a mandatory sentence of death and the experience of cruel,
inhuman and degrading conditions of detention. These are not just a
contingent effect of the conditions of detention in different prisons, but
flow directly from the psychological effect of the imposition of an
arbitrary sentence of death. In Hilaire, the Court noted that:
'in Soering v United Kingdom, the European Court found that the 'death row
phenomenon' is a cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and is
characterised by a prolonged period of detention while awaiting execution,
during which prisoners sentenced to death suffer severe mental anxiety in
addition to other circumstances, including, among others: the way in which
the sentence was imposed; lack of consideration of the personal
characteristics of the accused; the disproportionality between the
punishment and the crime committed; the detention conditions while
awaiting execution; delays in the appeal process or in reviewing the death
sentence during which time the individual faces extreme psychological
tension and trauma; the fact that the judge does not take into account the
age or mental state of the condemned person; as well as continuous
anticipation about what practices their execution may entail.
In the present Case, as a result of legislation and judicial procedures
that are contrary to the American Convention, all of the victims in the
present Case live under the constant threat that they may be taken to be
hanged at any moment. According to the report submitted by the expert
Gaietry Pargass, the procedures leading up to the death by hanging of
those convicted of murder terrorize and depress the prisoners; others
cannot sleep due to nightmares, much less eat. (at [167] to [168])
30. The Court concluded at [169] that such conditions impinged on the
applicants' physical and psychological integrity and therefore constituted
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
31. The Court is not required, in providing this Advisory Opinion, to
consider the actual conditions on death row in any of the states parties.
Those conditions may differ across the region. However, Amnesty
International notes that the Court's analysis in Hilaire drew out some
features of the detention of those under mandatory sentence of death which
are likely to apply across the board. In each case, the prisoner has
experienced the arbitrary imposition of the most serious possible
sentence. They have not been allowed to make any arguments why it should
not be imposed. They have, therefore, not been treated as individuals
under the law, but as part of a group. They experience huge tension about
appeal processes. These may or may not involve delays: again, actual
practice in states parties is not relevant to the present Opinion. They
experience continual fear about the actual imposition of the sentence.
32. These features suggest that there is, if not a necessary, then a
likely link between the imposition of a mandatory death penalty and the
experience of cruel, inhuman and degrading conditions of detention.
33. This link is relevant in considering the next issue, namely what would
be an appropriate remedy for such prisoners. The Court considered
reparation at [201] to [217] of its judgment in Hilaire. Taking into
account all its findings of violations of the Convention - Articles 4(1),
(2) and (6), 5(1) and (2), 7(5), 8(1) and 25, read with Articles 1(1) and
2 - the Court ordered the state of Trinidad and Tobago to refrain from
executing any of the applicants. In coming to this conclusion, the Court
applied the following principles:
'Reparation of harm caused by a violation of an international obligation
requires, whenever possible, full restitution (restitutio in integrum),
which consists of restoring the situation that existed before the
violation occurred. When this is not possible, as in the present Case, it
is the task of this international Tribunal to order the adoption of a
series of measures that, in addition to guaranteeing respect for the
rights violated, ensure that the damage resulting from the infractions is
repaired, and order the payment of an indemnity as compensation for the
harm caused in that case. The obligation to make reparations, which is
regulated in all its aspects (scope, nature, modalities, and designation
of beneficiaries) by international law, cannot be tempered or breached by
the violating State through the invocation of provisions of its domestic
law.' (at [203])
34. It is clear from the Court's analysis that the question of remedy for
inhuman and degrading conditions of detention cannot be entirely separated
from the fact that, where those conditions flow from the imposition of a
mandatory sentence of death, they flow from a sentence which violates the
Convention in any event, regardless of the conditions of detention.
35. However, in order to answer the Commission's second question in the
affirmative, the Court would not need to find that the conditions of
detention of mandatory death penalty prisoners necessarily entitle the
prisoner, without more, to commutation of sentence (although Amnesty
International would support such a conclusion). The Court need only find
that, given the analysis in Hilaire, commutation is one possible response
to the issue of prison conditions, and becomes a necessary response when
the other violations of the Convention inherent in the imposition of the
mandatory penalty are taken into account.
36. Amnesty International submits that it follows from this analysis that
a domestic law which precluded those under mandatory sentence of death
from even raising the possibility of commutation in the domestic courts
would violate the right to an effective remedy, guaranteed by Article 25.
(7) The carrying out of a mandatory sentence of death on an individual
with an application pending under the Inter-American human rights system
37. It is clear from the Court's analysis in Hilaire that the execution of
any person sentenced to the mandatory penalty would involve an arbitrary
deprivation of that person's right to life. This means that states parties
cannot in any circumstances either impose or carry out such a sentence.
38. The Commission's third question involves a further issue, namely
whether a state party could amend its constitution in order to prevent the
domestic courts from finding that the imposition or execution of such a
sentence is unconstitutional when the individual has a complaint pending
under the Inter-American system.
39. For the reasons given above, Amnesty International submits that the
clear effect of Article 25 is to require effective domestic remedies for
any violation of constitutional rights. The constitution of a state party
may or may not in fact protect the right not to be executed while an
international application is pending. However, in this context the
Convention is not neutral as to the content of domestic law. On this issue
there are international law obligations which must be effectively
translated into international law. The content of those obligations can be
seen from the case-law. In the case of James(6), the Court held that the
execution of an individual with a complaint pending before the
Inter-American system would: 'create an irremediable situation
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, would amount
to a disavowal of the authority of the Commission, and would adversely
effect the very essence of the Inter-American system.'
40. The serious consequences of legislation preventing an individual from
obtaining judicial protection from the domestic authorities while his or
her complaint was pending before the Inter-American system would be
compounded if the type of legislation contemplated by the Commission's
first question was in force. In such a case, redress at the international
level would be the person's only opportunity to enforce their Convention
rights.
CONCLUSION
41. For the reasons given above, Amnesty International respectfully
submits that the honourable Court should give the Advisory Opinion sought,
and should answer each of the Commission's three questions in the
affirmative.
********
(1) This amicus curiae brief has been drafted for Amnesty International
by: Professor Vaughan Lowe, Essex Court Chambers, and Alison Macdonald,
Matrix Chambers, London, United Kingdom.
(2) For example, Amnesty International has intervened as amicus curiae in
the following cases before the European Court of Human Rights: Acar v.
Turkey (Application No. 26307/95), 6 May 2003 (preliminary issue) 8 April
2004; Aydin v. Turkey (Application No 28293/95; 29494/95; 30219/96), 10
July 2001; Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria (Application No 24760/94), 18
October 1998; Kurt v. Turkey (Application No 24276/94), 25 May 1998;
Chahal v. United Kingdom (Application No. 22414/93), 15 November 1996;
Akdivar and Others v. Turkey (Application No. 21893/93), 19 June 1996;
McCann and others v. United Kingdom (Application No.18984/91), 27
September 1995; Murray v. United Kingdom (Application No 18731/91), 28
October 1994; Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom (Application No
14553/89 and 14554/89), 26 May 1993; Soering v. United Kingdom
(Application No 14038/88), 7 July 1989.
(3) For example, Amnesty International has intervened as amicus curiae in
the following cases before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Case
of Velasquez-Rodriguez, Judgement of 29 July 1988; Case of Godinez-Cruz,
Judgement of 20 January 1989; Case of Fairen-Garbi and Solis-Corrales,
Judgement of 15 March 1989; Case of Benavides Cevallos, Judgement of 19
June 1998. Amnesty International has also intervened in the following
advisory opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: "Habeas
Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2) and 7(6) American Convention
on Human Rights" (OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987); "Judicial Guarantees in
States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American Convention on Human
Rights" (OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987) and "The Right to Information on
Consular Assistance, in the framework of the guarantees of the Due Process
of Law" (OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999).
(4) The appeal to the House of Lords of the judgment by the English High
Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division on 28 October 1998 in the cases,
In the Matter of an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjicendum
(Re: Augusto Pinochet Ugarte) and In the Matter of an Application for
Leave to Move for Judicial Review between: The Queen v. Nicholas Evans et
al. (Ex Parte Augusto Pinochet Ugarte).
(5) Boyce and Joseph v The Queen [2004] 3 WLR 786; Watson v The Queen
[2004] 3 WLR 841; Matthew v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2004] 3 WLR 812.
(6) Case of James et al vs. Trinidad & Tobago. Order of the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights of 29 August, 1998; para 9 of the considerations of
the Court.
(source: Amnesty International)
