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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel#action_12463639
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Rick Hillegas commented on DERBY-2109:
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Daniel John Debrunner (JIRA) wrote:
>Ok - I think I get it. You writing this assuming that DERBY-2196 is done and
>doesn't control system shutdown or database creation, and then this spec
>describes how that basic policy would be changed by t>hese permissions. Right?
>Just hadn't thought of that order. :-)
Right, that's what was in my brain area.
>One issue I see in the network server section is that it assumes a mapping
>between the Java (OS) user name and the database user name. This would be a
>first for Derby, no where else is such an >assumption made.
I>.e. ${user.name} is never used elsewhere in the code.
>Not sure of the implications of this, or if there is a better user name to
>grant shutdown system to for the basic policy.
Freewheeling some other alternatives which have various drawbacks:
1) The Basic policy could grant shutdownEngine to everyone. Seems insecure.
2) We could add an optional argument to the server startup command, letting the
customer specify the userName of a Principal who should have shutdownEngine
power. This would not be useful if the customer had their own Principal
implementation.
3) We could add another method to UserAuthenticator. That method would return
an array of Principals who should have shutdownEngine power. If using the
builtin UserAuthenticator, this would default to just the DatabasePrincipal
named ${user.name}.
Your issue also made me realize that the spec needs to say something about what
the Basic policy should be for createDatabase privilege. Here are some
suggestions:
A) This could be the same user(s) who have shutdownEngine privilege.
B) This could be granted to everyone.
> System privileges
> -----------------
>
> Key: DERBY-2109
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109
> Project: Derby
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Components: Security
> Affects Versions: 10.3.0.0
> Reporter: Rick Hillegas
> Fix For: 10.3.0.0
>
> Attachments: systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html
>
>
> Add mechanisms for controlling system-level privileges in Derby. See the
> related email discussion at
> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.apache.db.derby.devel/33151.
> The 10.2 GRANT/REVOKE work was a big step forward in making Derby more
> secure in a client/server configuration. I'd like to plug more client/server
> security holes in 10.3. In particular, I'd like to focus on authorization
> issues which the ANSI spec doesn't address.
> Here are the important issues which came out of the email discussion.
> Missing privileges that are above the level of a single database:
> - Create Database
> - Shutdown all databases
> - Shutdown System
> Missing privileges specific to a particular database:
> - Shutdown that Database
> - Encrypt that database
> - Upgrade database
> - Create (in that Database) Java Plugins (currently Functions/Procedures,
> but someday Aggregates and VTIs)
> Note that 10.2 gave us GRANT/REVOKE control over the following
> database-specific issues, via granting execute privilege to system
> procedures:
> Jar Handling
> Backup Routines
> Admin Routines
> Import/Export
> Property Handling
> Check Table
> In addition, since 10.0, the privilege of connecting to a database has been
> controlled by two properties (derby.database.fullAccessUsers and
> derby.database.defaultConnectionMode) as described in the security section of
> the Developer's Guide (see
> http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/10.2/devguide/cdevcsecure865818.html).
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