There seem to be three basic ideas here: 0. Blacklisting at the level of API rather than site. 1. Some centralized but democratic mechanism for building a list of misbehaving sites. 2. A mechanism for distributing the list of misbehaving sites to clients.
As Jonathan notes, Firefox already has a mechanism for doing #2, which is to say "Safe Browsing". Now, Safe Browsing is binary, either a site is good or bad, but specific APIs aren't disabled, but it's easy to see how you would extend it to that if you actually wanted to provide that function. I'm not sure that's actually very attractive--it's hard enough for users to understand safe browsing. Safe Browsing is of course centralized, but that comes with a number of advantages and it's not clear what the advantage of decentralized blacklist dissemination is, given the networking realities. You posit a mechanism for forming the list of misbehaving sites, but distributed reputation is really hard, and it's not clear that Google is actually doing a bad job of running Safe Browsing, so given that this is a fairly major unsolved problem, I'd be reluctant to set out to build a mechanism like this without a pretty clear design. -Ekr On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 2:40 PM, Salvador de la Puente < sdelapue...@mozilla.com> wrote: > Hi Jonathan > > In the short and medium terms, it scales better than a white list and distributes the effort of finding APIs misuses. Mozilla and other vendor > browser could still review the code of the site and add its vote in favour > or against the Web property. > > In the long term, the system would help finding new security threats such a > tracking or fingerprinting algorithms by encouraging the honest report of > evidences, somehow. > > With this system, the threat is considered the result of both potential > risk and chances of actual misuse. The revocation protocol reduces > threatening situations by minimising the number of Web properties abusing > the APIs. > > As a side effect, it provides the infrastructure for a real distributed and > cross browser database which can be of utility for other unforeseen uses. > > What do you think? > > > El 8 mar. 2017 10:54 p. m., "Jonathan Kingston" <jkings...@mozilla.com> > escribió: > > Hey, > What would be the advantage of using this over the safesite list? Obviously > there would be less broken sites on the web as we would be permitting the > site to still be viewed by the user rather than just revoking the > permission but are there other advantages? > > On Sun, Mar 5, 2017 at 4:23 PM, Salvador de la Puente < > sdelapue...@mozilla.com> wrote: > > > Hi, folks. > > > > Some time ago, I've started to think about an idea to experiment with new > > powerful Web APIs: a sort of "deceptive site" database for harmful uses > of > > browsers APIs. I've been curating that idea and come up with the concept > of > > a "revocation protocol" to revoke user granted permissions for origins > > abusing those APIs. > > > > I published the idea on GitHub [1] and I was wondering about the utility > > and feasibility of such a system so I would thank any feedback you want > to > > provide. > > > > I hope it will be of interest for you. > > > > [1] https://github.com/delapuente/revocation-protocol > > > > -- > > <salva /> > > _______________________________________________ > > dev-platform mailing list > > dev-platform@lists.mozilla.org > > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-platform > > > _______________________________________________ > dev-platform mailing list > dev-platform@lists.mozilla.org > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-platform > _______________________________________________ dev-platform mailing list dev-platform@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-platform
