There are lots of occasions:
1) Where a server with a private key is missing but there isn't yet an
active attack
2) Where the key was compromised
3) Where an error occurred and the certificate information identified the
wrong entity
4) Where the certificate was issued in accordance with the then-applicable
standards but standards have made the certificate untrustworthy (internal
names, 1024, SHA1)
5) Where the certificate profile is incorrect (lacks the appropriate EKU or
requested with incomplete information)

All of these are security concerns that don't have an active attacker and
where even a soft-fail revocation effectively mitigates the risk.

Jeremy

-----Original Message-----
From: dev-security-policy
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla
.org] On Behalf Of Brian Smith
Sent: Monday, October 28, 2013 1:14 PM
To: Rick Andrews
Cc: dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Netcraft blog, violations of CABF Baseline Requirements, any
consequences?

On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 11:31 AM, Rick Andrews <r.andr...@computer.org>
wrote:
> Brian, you seem to be saying that revocation checking adds value only when
there's an attacker involved. If that's your point, I disagree. There are
cases in which a CA revokes a certificate because the site has
misrepresented itself, and revocation serves as a warning to the client.

Thanks for the clarification. Could you give an example where such a
revocation would be useful to know about to a Firefox user to the extent
where the cost of doing the revocation checking is justified?
So far, I'm of the opinion when there's no attacker, there's no problem (no
harm, no foul).

Cheers,
Brian
--
Mozilla Networking/Crypto/Security (Necko/NSS/PSM)
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