> On Nov 5, 2016, at 6:49 AM, Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Saturday, November 5, 2016 at 2:06:00 AM UTC-7, Gervase Markham wrote: >> On 04/11/16 21:23, Ryan Sleevi wrote: >>> If there's concerns about GAs - would it be best to reply on this thread or >>> start a new one per-CA? >> >> If there's more than one CA, perhaps a new one per CA would be better, >> please. > > Well, mostly I'm trying to understand why you listed the following as "GA - > EKU but not serverAuth" > https://crt.sh/?cablint=211&iCAID=70&minNotBefore=2016-01-01&opt=cablint > https://crt.sh/?cablint=211&iCAID=104&minNotBefore=2016-01-01&opt=cablint > > Even though the individual certs, such as > https://crt.sh/?id=39635446&opt=cablint or > https://crt.sh/?id=31394742&opt=cablint , have an EKU, their issuing CAs, > https://crt.sh/?caid=104&opt=cablint and https://crt.sh/?caid=70&opt=cablint > , do not. > > As noted elsewhere, the issuance of SHA-1 allows for an attacker to pivot the > contents of the certificates, and the only mitigation is the EKU on the > sub-CA. > > Are you suggesting this is GA because it wasn't clear enough to CA members at > the time this was issued? Because I can't help but feel that this particular > point was discussed at considerable length prior to these CA's issuances.
There is no policy from any trust store, as far as I know, that says the private key for a CA cannot be used to create signatures over SHA-1 hashes. The policies are all about the content that goes into the hash and, as far as I know, only limit the content if the content is a certificate usable for server authentication. Is this a problem? Maybe. We know about the risks of pivoting, but if browsers disable SHA-1 that risk goes away. Thanks, Peter _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

