> On Nov 5, 2016, at 6:49 AM, Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> On Saturday, November 5, 2016 at 2:06:00 AM UTC-7, Gervase Markham wrote:
>> On 04/11/16 21:23, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>>> If there's concerns about GAs - would it be best to reply on this thread or 
>>> start a new one per-CA?
>> 
>> If there's more than one CA, perhaps a new one per CA would be better,
>> please.
> 
> Well, mostly I'm trying to understand why you listed the following as "GA - 
> EKU but not serverAuth"
> https://crt.sh/?cablint=211&iCAID=70&minNotBefore=2016-01-01&opt=cablint
> https://crt.sh/?cablint=211&iCAID=104&minNotBefore=2016-01-01&opt=cablint
> 
> Even though the individual certs, such as 
> https://crt.sh/?id=39635446&opt=cablint or 
> https://crt.sh/?id=31394742&opt=cablint , have an EKU, their issuing CAs, 
> https://crt.sh/?caid=104&opt=cablint and https://crt.sh/?caid=70&opt=cablint 
> , do not.
> 
> As noted elsewhere, the issuance of SHA-1 allows for an attacker to pivot the 
> contents of the certificates, and the only mitigation is the EKU on the 
> sub-CA.
> 
> Are you suggesting this is GA because it wasn't clear enough to CA members at 
> the time this was issued? Because I can't help but feel that this particular 
> point was discussed at considerable length prior to these CA's issuances.

There is no policy from any trust store, as far as I know, that says the 
private key for a CA cannot be used to create signatures over SHA-1 hashes.  
The policies are all about the content that goes into the hash and, as far as I 
know, only limit the content if the content is a certificate usable for server 
authentication.

Is this a problem? Maybe.  We know about the risks of pivoting, but if browsers 
disable SHA-1 that risk goes away.

Thanks,
Peter


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