On Saturday, 5 November 2016 15:56:39 UTC, Peter Bowen  wrote:
> Is this a problem? Maybe.  We know about the risks of pivoting, but if 
> browsers disable SHA-1 that risk goes away.

The risk exists so long as anything trusts SHA-1 signatures. Disabling SHA-1 in 
current versions of browsers narrows the scope of the risk, and we hope that 
doing so alters the value proposition of an attack, thereby also protecting the 
rest of the ecosystem -- but the risk doesn't vanish altogether. If it gets 
cheap enough - and CAs contribute to that by routinely signing things an 
attacker could interfere with - even a very modest pay-off would be worthwhile.

If creating a collision becomes cheap enough it could be viable even for 
spear-phishing a single target. Big Boss has a crappy phone that isn't getting 
security updates any more? MITM their Internet connection and interpose a 
certificate produced through SHA-1 collision to impersonate their bank, spin a 
convincing story, get their credentials, empty their accounts. As far as the 
target knows it's an inside job by the bank, could take months before anybody 
would understand what really happened.

The browser change is defence in depth, the CAs have a big role to play here in 
eliminating SHA-1 signing and taking steps to make exploiting it harder and 
less useful, such as the use of EKUs on intermediates and forcing certificates 
to have long, unpredictable serial numbers to make chosen prefix attacks harder.
_______________________________________________
dev-security-policy mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Reply via email to