On Saturday, 5 November 2016 15:56:39 UTC, Peter Bowen wrote: > Is this a problem? Maybe. We know about the risks of pivoting, but if > browsers disable SHA-1 that risk goes away.
The risk exists so long as anything trusts SHA-1 signatures. Disabling SHA-1 in current versions of browsers narrows the scope of the risk, and we hope that doing so alters the value proposition of an attack, thereby also protecting the rest of the ecosystem -- but the risk doesn't vanish altogether. If it gets cheap enough - and CAs contribute to that by routinely signing things an attacker could interfere with - even a very modest pay-off would be worthwhile. If creating a collision becomes cheap enough it could be viable even for spear-phishing a single target. Big Boss has a crappy phone that isn't getting security updates any more? MITM their Internet connection and interpose a certificate produced through SHA-1 collision to impersonate their bank, spin a convincing story, get their credentials, empty their accounts. As far as the target knows it's an inside job by the bank, could take months before anybody would understand what really happened. The browser change is defence in depth, the CAs have a big role to play here in eliminating SHA-1 signing and taking steps to make exploiting it harder and less useful, such as the use of EKUs on intermediates and forcing certificates to have long, unpredictable serial numbers to make chosen prefix attacks harder. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

