On 25/01/17 17:55, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > Yes, I think it results in a clearer communication that is otherwise > identical, and ensures that there is community consensus on policy changes > :)
Draft of new Maintenance Policy section, bullet 8: We consider the following algorithms and key sizes to be acceptable in root certificates in our root program, and in any certificate which chains up to them: * RSA keys with a minimum modulus size of 2048 bits * ECDSA keys using one of the named curves: P‐256, P‐384, or P‐521 * Digest algorithms: SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 (This would then be a good place to put the final text of our SHA-1 policy, which is being hashed out in another thread and which permits SHA-1 under certain specific non-server-auth circumstances.) Open questions: 1) Do we support P-521? Our current policy says we do, although it's mis-identified as P-512, but the previous discussion of this suggested that we don't. 2) Brian has also suggested we mandate a matching of ECDSA curves with digest algorithms. Do we want to do that? 3) Do we want to add Ed25519? 4) Do we want to do the spec using AlgorithmIdentifiers instead of free text? Aren't AlgorithmIdentifiers used for something a bit different? Gerv _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
