> pzb: Policy Suggestion A) When transferring a root that is EV enabled, it 
> should be clearly stated whether the recipient of the root is also 
> receiving the EV policy OID(s). 

> Gerv: I agree with this suggestion; we should update 
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:RootTransferPolicy , and eventually 
> incorporate it into the main policy when we fix 
> https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/57 . 

I think this is good.


> Gerv: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:RootTransferPolicy says that "The 
> organization who is transferring ownership of the root certificate’s 
> private key must ensure that the transfer recipient is able to fully 
> comply with Mozilla’s CA Certificate Policy. The original organization 
> will continue to be responsible for the root certificate's private key 
> until the transfer recipient has provided Mozilla with their Primary 
> Point of Contact, CP/CPS documentation, and audit statement (or opinion 
> letter) confirming successful transfer of the root certificate and key." 

> Gerv: I would say that an organization which has acquired a root certificate 
> in the program and which has provided Mozilla with the above-mentioned 
> information is thereby a member of the program. As the policy says that 
> the transferring entity continues to be responsible until the 
> information is provided, that seems OK to me. 

This seems reasonable to me also.

> Gerv: This position would logically lead to the position that a root 
> inclusion 
> request from an organization which does not have any roots is also, 
> implicitly, an application to become a member of the program but the two 
> things are distinct. One can become a member of the program in other 
> ways. Membership is sort of something that happens to one automatically 
> when one successfully achieves ownership of an included root. 

This seems reasonable to me also.


> pzb: Policy Suggestion B) Require that any organization wishing to become 
> a member of the program submit a bug with links to content 
> demonstrating compliance with the Mozilla policy.  Require that this 
> be public prior to taking control of any root in the program. 

> Gerv: We do require this, but not publicly. I note and recognise Ryan's 
> concern about requiring advance disclosure of private deals. I could see 
> a requirement that a transferred root was not allowed to issue anything 
> until the appropriate paperwork was publicly in place. Would that be 
> suitable? 

Could you clarify what you mean by appropriate paperwork?


> pzb: Policy Suggestion C) Recognize that root transfers are distinct from 
> the acquisition of a program member.  Acquisition of a program 
> member (meaning purchase of the company) is a distinctly different 
> activity from moving only a private key, as the prior business 
> controls no longer apply in the latter case. 

> Gerv: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:RootTransferPolicy does make this 
distinction, I feel - how could it be better made? 

After re-reading this text I personally think this is clear.


> pzb: Policy Suggestion D) Moving from being a RA to a CA or moving from 
> being a single tier/online (i.e. Subordinate-only) CA to being a 
> multi-tier/root CA requires a PITRA 

> Gerv: Again, would this be covered by a requirement that no issuance was 
> permitted from a transferred root until all the paperwork was in place, 
> including appropriately-scoped audits? This might lead to a PITRA, but 
> would not have to. 

This seems reasonable to me also.
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