> pzb: Policy Suggestion A) When transferring a root that is EV enabled, it > should be clearly stated whether the recipient of the root is also > receiving the EV policy OID(s).
> Gerv: I agree with this suggestion; we should update > https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:RootTransferPolicy , and eventually > incorporate it into the main policy when we fix > https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/57 . I think this is good. > Gerv: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:RootTransferPolicy says that "The > organization who is transferring ownership of the root certificate’s > private key must ensure that the transfer recipient is able to fully > comply with Mozilla’s CA Certificate Policy. The original organization > will continue to be responsible for the root certificate's private key > until the transfer recipient has provided Mozilla with their Primary > Point of Contact, CP/CPS documentation, and audit statement (or opinion > letter) confirming successful transfer of the root certificate and key." > Gerv: I would say that an organization which has acquired a root certificate > in the program and which has provided Mozilla with the above-mentioned > information is thereby a member of the program. As the policy says that > the transferring entity continues to be responsible until the > information is provided, that seems OK to me. This seems reasonable to me also. > Gerv: This position would logically lead to the position that a root > inclusion > request from an organization which does not have any roots is also, > implicitly, an application to become a member of the program but the two > things are distinct. One can become a member of the program in other > ways. Membership is sort of something that happens to one automatically > when one successfully achieves ownership of an included root. This seems reasonable to me also. > pzb: Policy Suggestion B) Require that any organization wishing to become > a member of the program submit a bug with links to content > demonstrating compliance with the Mozilla policy. Require that this > be public prior to taking control of any root in the program. > Gerv: We do require this, but not publicly. I note and recognise Ryan's > concern about requiring advance disclosure of private deals. I could see > a requirement that a transferred root was not allowed to issue anything > until the appropriate paperwork was publicly in place. Would that be > suitable? Could you clarify what you mean by appropriate paperwork? > pzb: Policy Suggestion C) Recognize that root transfers are distinct from > the acquisition of a program member. Acquisition of a program > member (meaning purchase of the company) is a distinctly different > activity from moving only a private key, as the prior business > controls no longer apply in the latter case. > Gerv: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:RootTransferPolicy does make this distinction, I feel - how could it be better made? After re-reading this text I personally think this is clear. > pzb: Policy Suggestion D) Moving from being a RA to a CA or moving from > being a single tier/online (i.e. Subordinate-only) CA to being a > multi-tier/root CA requires a PITRA > Gerv: Again, would this be covered by a requirement that no issuance was > permitted from a transferred root until all the paperwork was in place, > including appropriately-scoped audits? This might lead to a PITRA, but > would not have to. This seems reasonable to me also. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

