Why we setup one EV OID for all roots is that we use the same policy for all EV 
SSL certificate no matter it is issued by which root. The policy OID is unique 
ID 

If Google use the GlobalSign EV OID, and GlobalSign also use this EV OID, this 
means two companies use the same policy? 

It is better to do a test: Google issue a EV SSL certificate from this acquired 
root using the GlobalSign EV OID, then check every browser's UI display info, 
to check if that info will confuse the browser users.


Best Regards,

Richard

-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Bowen [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: Thursday, March 9, 2017 1:11 PM
To: Richard Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]>; Gervase Markham <[email protected]>; 
[email protected]
Subject: Re: Google Trust Services roots

Richard,

I'm afraid a few things are confused here.

First, a single CA Operator may have multiple roots in the browser trust list.  
Each root may list one or more certificate policies that map to the EV policy.  
Multiple roots that follow the same policy may use the same policy IDs and 
different roots from the same operator may use different policies.

For example, I see the following in the Microsoft trust list:

CN=CA 沃通根证书,O=WoSign CA Limited,C=CN
CN=Class 1 Primary CA,O=Certplus,C=FR
CN=Certification Authority of WoSign,O=WoSign CA Limited,C=CN CN=CA WoSign ECC 
Root,O=WoSign CA Limited,C=CN CN=Certification Authority of WoSign G2,O=WoSign 
CA Limited,C=CN each of these has one EV mapped policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.36305.2

CN=AffirmTrust Commercial,O=AffirmTrust,C=US has policy
1.3.6.1.4.1.34697.2.1 mapped to EV
CN=AffirmTrust Networking,O=AffirmTrust,C=US has policy
1.3.6.1.4.1.34697.2.2 mapped to EV
CN=AffirmTrust Premium,O=AffirmTrust,C=US has policy
1.3.6.1.4.1.34697.2.3 mapped to EV
CN=AffirmTrust Premium ECC,O=AffirmTrust,C=US has policy
1.3.6.1.4.1.34697.2.4 mapped to EV
All of these are from the same company but each has their own policy identifier.

The information on "Identified by <something>" in Microsoft's browsers comes 
from the "Friendly Name" field in the trust list. For example the friendly name 
of CN=Class 1 Primary CA,O=Certplus,C=FR is "WoSign 1999".

For something like the AffirmTrust example, they could easily sell one root 
along with the exclusive right to use that root's EV OID without impacting 
their other OIDs.

Does that make sense?

Thanks,
Peter

On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 8:44 PM, Richard Wang via dev-security-policy 
<[email protected]> wrote:
> I don’t think so, please check this page: 
> https://cabforum.org/object-registry/ that listed most CA’s EV OID, and all 
> browsers ask for the CA’s own EV OID when applying inclusion and EV enabled. 
> So, as I understand that the browser display EV green bar and display the 
> “Identified by CA name” is based on this CA’s EV OID.
>
>
>
> I don’t think Symantec have the reason to use GlobalSign EV OID in its EV SSL 
> certificate, why Symantec don’t use his own EV OID? If Symantec issued a EV 
> SSL using GlobalSign's EV OID, I think IE browser will display this EV SSL is 
> identified by GlobalSign, not by Symantec.
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