I've changed the subject of this thread because I have criticisms of all 3 parties involved in this transaction and will be bringing them up separately.
That said, "criticism" may be too strong a word in this case because I think I do understand and appreciate the position that Mozilla is in regarding confidential transactions such as this. And while Mozilla's actions seem perfectly reasonable, I can't help but think this transaction is a train wreck in the making. It would be good if Mozilla could prevent train wrecks when possible and to do so probably requires updates to the Root Transfer Policy. To that end, here are some thoughts to get things going: * Types of transfers: I don't think the situation was envisioned where a single root would be transferred between entities in such a way that company names and branding would become intermingled. My own personal opinion is that such intermingling is not in the public interest and should be prohibited. That very likely could be too strong a stance for Mozilla--which is fine--but it would be good to have Mozilla's position clearly articulated should a situation like this arise again. * Manner of transfer: As we learned from Ryan H., a second HSM was introduced for the transfer of the private key meaning that for a period of time 2 copies of the private key were in existence. Presumably one copy was destroyed at some point, but I'm not familiar with any relevant standards or requirements to know when/how that takes place. Whatever the case may be, this situation seems to fall outside of the Root Transfer Policy as I now read it. Also, did GlobalSign ever confirm to Mozilla that they are no longer in possession of or otherwise have access to the private key for those 2 roots? * Conduct of the transfer: I think an expectation should be set that the "current holder of the trust" must be the one to drive the transfer. Trust can be handed to someone else; reaching in and taking trust doesn't sound very...trustworthy? To that end, I think the policy should state that the current root holder must do more than merely notify Mozilla about the change in ownership; the holder (and their auditor) must provide the audits, attestations, and answers to questions that come up. Only after the transfer is complete would the "new holder" step in to perform those duties. * Public notification: I appreciate that confidentiality is required when business transactions are being discussed but at some point, in the interest of transparency, the public must be notified of the transfer. I think this is implied (or assumed) in the current policy, but it might be good to state explicitly that a public announcement must be made. I would add that making an announcement at a CABF meeting is all well and good, but considering that most people on the Internet are not able to attend those meetings it would be good if an announcement could be made in other forums as well. I imagine there are more things we'll want to discuss but hopefully this is enough to start the discussion. On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 9:54 AM, Gervase Markham <[email protected]> wrote: > On 08/03/17 03:54, Peter Kurrasch wrote: > > - Google has acquired 2 root certificates from GMO GlobalSign but not > > the company itself. > > Yes. > > > GMO GlobalSign will continue to own other roots and > > will use only those other roots for the various products and services > > they choose to offer going forward. > > Not quite. GMO GlobalSign continues to control some subCAs of the roots > it sold to Google, and is using those (presumably) to wind down its > interest in those roots over time or support customer migrations to > other roots. This happens to include issuing EV certificates. > > > There is no affiliation or business > > relationship between GMO GlobalSign and Google after the completion of > > the acquisition. > > We don't have information on this; the terms of the deal, and indeed any > other deals the two companies may have made, are not public. > > > - No public announcement of the acquisition was made prior to January > > 26, 2017 via the Google security blog. > > Depends what you mean by announcement, but they applied in a public bug > for inclusion in the Mozilla root program in December: > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1325532 > and, I think, announced their intention in a publicly-minuted meeting of > the CAB Forum in Redmond in mid-October 2016. > > > - No disclosure has been made regarding what specific items were > > acquired, including such things as: "private key material" (HSM's and > > whatnot); computer equipment used as web servers, OCSP responders, etc.; > > domain names, IP addresses, and other infrastructure used in the > > operations and maintenance of the acquired roots; data such as > > subscriber lists, databases, server logs, payment details and histories, > > certificate issuance activities and histories, etc.; any access rights > > to physical space such as offices, data centers, development and test > > facilities, and so forth; and last, but not least, any personnel, > > documentation, training materials, or other knowledge products. > > I have not seen such disclosure. > > > - The scope of impact to existing GlobalSign customers is not known. > > Well, as Globalsign continues to operate those subCAs, I would hope the > impact on GlobalSign customers is minimal. > > > Neither GMO GlobalSign nor Google have notified any existing clients of > > the acquisition. > > Unless we hear from such clients, we can't know this one way or the other. > > > - The GlobalSign web site has no mention of this acquisition for reasons > > which are unknown. > > Why would this be a requirement by anyone? > > > Further, the web site does not make their CP/CPS > > documents readily available > > Which website? The CP/CPS documents for which root(s)? > > The GTS CP and CPS are here: http://pki.goog/. > > > - A relying party who takes the initiative to review a certificate chain > > that goes up to either of the acquired roots will see that it is > > anchored (or "verified by") GlobalSign. No mention of Google will be > > made anywhere in the user interface. > > I would expect there to be intermediate certificates with Google's name > in; it's not permitted to issue EE certs directly from a root. However, > neither GlobalSign's nor Google's name would appear in primary UI in > Firefox, as we don't display CA names. > > > - Google has acquired these roots in order to better serve their > > subscribers, which are organizations (not people) throughout the many > > Google companies. > > That's a question for Google. > > > Relying parties (i.e. end users of the various Google > > products) are not affected positively or negatively by this acquisition. > > That's a matter of opinion :-) > > > - Mozilla granted Google's request to keep the acquisition confidential > > based on statements made by Google and Google's auditor E&Y. > > That implies a cause and effect which is not present in the way > suggested. We require that changes of ownership be disclosed, but we > don't require them to be made public. Google and GlobalSign disclosed > this change of ownership in accordance with our requirements. We also > expect to see various audits which meet our auditing requirements over > any transition period; my understanding is that Kathleen was satisfied > with the documentation she saw. However, the keeping confidential of the > acquisition was not conditioned on the presentation of audit documentation. > > > Neither > > GlobalSign nor their auditors offered any opinion on this matter. > > Would you expect them to? > > Gerv > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

