Most are not directed at me so I won’t respond to each item, but for several I think I can provide some additional context, see below:
> * Manner of transfer: As we learned from Ryan H., a second HSM was > introduced for the transfer of the private key meaning that for a period of > time 2 copies of the private key were in existence. Presumably one copy > was destroyed at some point, but I'm not familiar with any relevant > standards or requirements to know when/how that takes place. Whatever the > case may be, this situation seems to fall outside of the Root Transfer > Policy as I now read it. Also, did GlobalSign ever confirm to Mozilla that > they are no longer in possession of or otherwise have access to the private > key for those 2 roots? A few things are relevant to this comment. First, when designing a key management program for keys that may live ten or twenty years it is extremely important one builds a disaster recovery plan. Such plans require duplicate copies of keys exist. Basically no responsible CA would not have backups of their keys. Additionally given the reliability and performance requirements issuing CAs also, almost always, are deployed with a cluster of HSMs. The point of mentioning the above is that having multiple copies of keys is a standard practice. Regarding who has control over the associated keys, you are correct, as is the standard practice (this is my 8th transfer in my professional career) the process of transfer Involved reviewing the history and associated artifacts of the keys and ensuring, in the presence of our auditors, all copies not belonging to Google were destroyed. While I can not speak for GlobalSign I can state that I do know they notified all root relevant programs that they no longer have control of the associated keys. > * Conduct of the transfer: I think an expectation should be set that the > "current holder of the trust" must be the one to drive the transfer. Trust > can be handed to someone else; reaching in and taking trust doesn't sound > very...trustworthy? To that end, I think the policy should state that the > current root holder must do more than merely notify Mozilla about the > change in ownership; the holder (and their auditor) must provide the > audits, attestations, and answers to questions that come up. Only after > the transfer is complete would the "new holder" step in to perform those > duties. It is the expectation of the Mozilla Program as well as the Microsoft Program (and others) that the current holder of the trust drives the transfer. That was what happened in this case aswell. As was noted in the original thread Mozilla does not publicly require permission to be secured but does so privately and in this case that permission was secured, at least implicitly since we discussed with Mozilla our purchase numerous times before terms were reached. Other programs, such as Microsoft make this requirement public so we explicitly secured their permission before finalizing terms as well. While securing such permission complicates the the process I think the value to the ecosystem is warrents the complication and I think it makes sense for Mozilla to formalize their requirement to secure permission before a transfer. > * Public notification: I appreciate that confidentiality is required when > business transactions are being discussed but at some point, in the > interest of transparency, the public must be notified of the transfer. I > think this is implied (or assumed) in the current policy, but it might be > good to state explicitly that a public announcement must be made. I would > add that making an announcement at a CABF meeting is all well and good, but > considering that most people on the Internet are not able to attend those > meetings it would be good if an announcement could be made in other forums > as well. This representation misrepresents what notification has taken place, for others I suggest reading the other thread for a more accurate representation. To the specific policy suggestion, the fact that changes in the Mozilla program are all tracked via public channels like the bug database and this forum mean that today public notice is already mandated. There may be value in requiring something “larger” than that, but defining that in a concrete way is hard. In our case when we published our blog post it was picked up by many technical publications but that is because we are Google. In historic transfers of keys, the actors in the transfer were not as visible as Google and as such their public notices were, well... .not noticed. One thing that could be a reasonable step is to require that on their document repository, for some period of time after a transfer they maintain notice there. I am not sure this materially Moves the bar forward in that, I can say I have seen the web traffic for many repository pages for Some of the larger trusted CAs and my personal blog gets way more traffic. That said, it does seem reasonable to require something more than the bug and forum conversations. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

