On 10/03/17 06:41, Peter Kurrasch wrote: > * Types of transfers: I don't think the situation was envisioned where a > single root would be transferred between entities in such a way that > company names and branding would become intermingled. My own personal > opinion is that such intermingling is not in the public interest and should > be prohibited. That very likely could be too strong a stance for > Mozilla--which is fine--but it would be good to have Mozilla's position > clearly articulated should a situation like this arise again.
Our position is that root transfers which mean the company named in the root is no longer an operator are an inevitable fact of life. Trying to stop them would have a number of negative effects, including making it harder for new entrants to join the WebPKI - and I'd say that recently new entrants have made a positive contribution to the security of the web. If Firefox ever displays the CA name in UI that ordinary users are likely to notice, we would need to take account of this issue. But we don't, so we don't. > * Manner of transfer: As we learned from Ryan H., a second HSM was > introduced for the transfer of the private key meaning that for a period of > time 2 copies of the private key were in existence. Presumably one copy > was destroyed at some point, but I'm not familiar with any relevant > standards or requirements to know when/how that takes place. Whatever the > case may be, this situation seems to fall outside of the Root Transfer > Policy as I now read it. [citation needed] > Also, did GlobalSign ever confirm to Mozilla that > they are no longer in possession of or otherwise have access to the private > key for those 2 roots? I'm not sure, but I'm pretty sure Google would have made pretty sure this was the case! :-) > * Conduct of the transfer: I think an expectation should be set that the > "current holder of the trust" must be the one to drive the transfer. Trust > can be handed to someone else; reaching in and taking trust doesn't sound > very...trustworthy? To that end, I think the policy should state that the > current root holder must do more than merely notify Mozilla about the > change in ownership; the holder (and their auditor) must provide the > audits, attestations, and answers to questions that come up. Only after > the transfer is complete would the "new holder" step in to perform those > duties. I think the policy already says this: "When the physical relocation involves moving the certificate's private key to another organization, the original organization who is transferring the root certificate’s private key must ensure that the transfer recipient is able to fully comply with Mozilla’s CA Certificate Policy. The original organization will continue to be responsible for the root certificate until the transfer recipient has provided Mozilla with their Primary Point of Contact, CP/CPS documentation, and audit statement (or opinion letter) confirming successful transfer of the root certificate and key." > * Public notification: I appreciate that confidentiality is required when > business transactions are being discussed but at some point, in the > interest of transparency, the public must be notified of the transfer. I > think this is implied (or assumed) in the current policy, but it might be > good to state explicitly that a public announcement must be made. I would > add that making an announcement at a CABF meeting is all well and good, but > considering that most people on the Internet are not able to attend those > meetings it would be good if an announcement could be made in other forums > as well. My proposal elsewhere in this thread is that any transferred cert not be allowed to issue until "all the paperwork is in place" from the new CA - which means providing Mozilla with the necessary CP/CPS, audits etc., which is inevitably a public process. I don't think we can legislate for a minimum level of media coverage. :-) Gerv _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

