On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 5:33 AM Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

> On 16/03/17 13:15, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> > Or, put differently, it sounds as if you suggest the only obligation a CA
> > has to ensure their DTP auditors are qualified for the task at hand is
> if,
> > and only if, Mozilla requests those audits. In the absence of that
> request,
> > the CA is allowed to make their own individual determination. Further, it
> > seems that you are suggesting that if a CA makes that determination, and
> > it's incorrect, that's not a failure upon the CAs part, because they made
> > 'a decision', and the relevant portions of Mozilla policy only apply to
> the
> > 'next' audit.
>
> I am saying that, however, undesirable, our current policy could be
> interpreted this way, which is why I want to change it. You don't have
> to convince me that this situation is undesirable :-)
>
> Gerv
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Gerv,

I suppose the difficulty I have is I do not believe it can be interpreted
as you suggest, beyond you suggesting it, but without providing evidence as
to how that interpretation is self-consistent with the policy. Could you
perhaps share how you believe that interpretation is reasonable?
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