On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 5:33 AM Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:
> On 16/03/17 13:15, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > Or, put differently, it sounds as if you suggest the only obligation a CA > > has to ensure their DTP auditors are qualified for the task at hand is > if, > > and only if, Mozilla requests those audits. In the absence of that > request, > > the CA is allowed to make their own individual determination. Further, it > > seems that you are suggesting that if a CA makes that determination, and > > it's incorrect, that's not a failure upon the CAs part, because they made > > 'a decision', and the relevant portions of Mozilla policy only apply to > the > > 'next' audit. > > I am saying that, however, undesirable, our current policy could be > interpreted this way, which is why I want to change it. You don't have > to convince me that this situation is undesirable :-) > > Gerv > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy Gerv, I suppose the difficulty I have is I do not believe it can be interpreted as you suggest, beyond you suggesting it, but without providing evidence as to how that interpretation is self-consistent with the policy. Could you perhaps share how you believe that interpretation is reasonable? _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

