On Mon, Mar 20, 2017 at 8:36 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy <[email protected]> wrote: > On 17/03/17 15:30, Gervase Markham wrote: >> The URL for the draft of the next CA Communication is here: >> https://mozilla-mozillacaprogram.cs54.force.com/Communications/CACommunicationSurveySample?CACommunicationId=a050S000000G3K2 > > > * Action 5: policy 2.4 has some of these requirements but not all. I've > filed an issue to add any extra ones. > https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/66 > > > B) Your attention is drawn to the cablint and x509lint tools, which you > may wish to incorporate into your certificate issuance pipeline to get > early warning of circumstances when you are issuing certificates which > do not meet the Baseline Requirements (cablint) or X509 standards > (x509lint). > > https://github.com/kroeckx/x509lint > XXX What's the URL for cablint?
https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-March/010144.html > > E) SHA-1 and S/MIME > > Does your CA issue SHA-1 S/MIME certificates? If so, please explain your > plans for ceasing to do so, and any self-imposed or external deadlines > you are planning to meet. Mozilla plans to make policy in this area in > the future, so please explain any facts or constraints which you think > might be relevant to our considerations. Why is this limited to s/mime? It would be highly valuable to understand if any SHA-1 signatures are being created using keys trusted to sign server auth certs. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

