On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 1:38 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:
> On 23/03/2017 17:09, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > >> (Posting in a Google Capacity) >> >> I just wanted to notify the members of this Forum that we have started an >> Intent to Deprecate and Remove, consistent with our Blink process, related >> to certain certificates issued by Symantec Corporation. >> >> This is a proposed plan, not a final commitment, and we welcome all >> feedback from members of this Forum to understand the risks and challenges. >> To understand the goals of this process, you can find more details at >> https://www.chromium.org/blink >> >> You can participate in this discussion at https://groups.google.com/a/ch >> romium.org/forum/#!topic/blink-dev/eUAKwjihhBs >> >> > According to the linked document, Google is intending to distrust *all* > Symantec issued certificates with a validity longer than 9 months, > which is less that the 12 month validity normally being the minimum > that site operators can purchase from CAs such as Symantec. > > It is also worth noting that this is apparently scheduled to occur less > than 12 months from now (The document refers to Chrome/Blink version > numbers with no associated dates, but contains a mention that one of > the relevant releases would happen over the "winter holiday", > presumably Christmas 2017). > > Since I know of no commercial (as opposed to free) CAs that routinely > sell certificates with a duration of less than 12 months, this seems > highly draconian and designed to drive Symantec out of the CA business. > > It also seems to ignore every mitigating factor discussed in this > group, including those posted by Symantec themselves. > > For example the cited number of "30,000" affected certificates seems to > come from the number of certificates that Symantec is actively double > checking to ensure they were *not* misissued in a way similar to the > original 127. > > It would seem that the only way to remain interoperable with both > Chrome and the legacy devices and systems that trust only Symantec > owned roots, would be if Chrome's TLS implementation somehow identified > itself to servers as being a Chrome-based implementation before servers > present their certificate. > > The computing world at large would be significantly inconvenienced if > Symantec was forced to close down its CA business, in particular the > parts of that business catering to other markets than general WebPki > certificates. (In Google Capacity) By no means do I want to insist you must discuss on [email protected], but I do want to highlight that the process follows our Blink Process for assessing risk, and you're more than welcome and encouraged to share this feedback there to ensure it's considered in relation to the proposed plan for Chrome. If you wish to only address this relative to the Mozilla community, please feel free to do so here, and I in no means want to tell you where or how to do so. I can only state that communication to [email protected] is what will inform Google Chrome's approach to this matter. All the best, Ryan _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

