On 23/03/2017 20:27, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 1:38 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:
On 23/03/2017 17:09, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
(Posting in a Google Capacity)
I just wanted to notify the members of this Forum that we have started an
Intent to Deprecate and Remove, consistent with our Blink process, related
to certain certificates issued by Symantec Corporation.
This is a proposed plan, not a final commitment, and we welcome all
feedback from members of this Forum to understand the risks and challenges.
To understand the goals of this process, you can find more details at
https://www.chromium.org/blink
You can participate in this discussion at https://groups.google.com/a/ch
romium.org/forum/#!topic/blink-dev/eUAKwjihhBs
According to the linked document, Google is intending to distrust *all*
Symantec issued certificates with a validity longer than 9 months,
which is less that the 12 month validity normally being the minimum
that site operators can purchase from CAs such as Symantec.
It is also worth noting that this is apparently scheduled to occur less
than 12 months from now (The document refers to Chrome/Blink version
numbers with no associated dates, but contains a mention that one of
the relevant releases would happen over the "winter holiday",
presumably Christmas 2017).
Since I know of no commercial (as opposed to free) CAs that routinely
sell certificates with a duration of less than 12 months, this seems
highly draconian and designed to drive Symantec out of the CA business.
It also seems to ignore every mitigating factor discussed in this
group, including those posted by Symantec themselves.
For example the cited number of "30,000" affected certificates seems to
come from the number of certificates that Symantec is actively double
checking to ensure they were *not* misissued in a way similar to the
original 127.
It would seem that the only way to remain interoperable with both
Chrome and the legacy devices and systems that trust only Symantec
owned roots, would be if Chrome's TLS implementation somehow identified
itself to servers as being a Chrome-based implementation before servers
present their certificate.
The computing world at large would be significantly inconvenienced if
Symantec was forced to close down its CA business, in particular the
parts of that business catering to other markets than general WebPki
certificates.
The above message (and one by Symantec) were posted to the
mozilla.dev.security.policy newsgroup prior to becoming aware of
Google's decision to move the discussion to its own private mailing
list and procedures. I would encourage everyone concerned to keep the
public Mozilla newsgroup copied on all messages in this discussion,
which seems to have extremely wide repercussions.
Enjoy
Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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