I don't think it's a good idea to design our system around the idea of "What would a user be looking for if they read the cert chain manually". For example, in the US, if such a government agency chose to use a Government CA (as a user might reasonably expect!), their users would all get cert warnings with the Mozilla trust DB!
Even as someone pretty well versed in the WebPKI, I don't think my expectations about who the CA for a given site should be really are actionable. It seems to be that certs are for computers to consume, and only incidentally for humans to read (*hit tip* to SICP). Alex PS: To expand a bit on this thought experiment, if I were to enumerate all CAs over a bunch of websites, the only cases I can think of where human intuition has a defensible conclusion, is that certain CAs _shouldn't_ sign things, notably CAs intended only for limited usage (e.g. a Government CA designed for signing government website certs). These cases are, I think, much better handled by Name Constraints (or some other technical constraint), and that's an entirely different subject altogether. On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 2:42 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote: > On 29/03/2017 16:47, Gervase Markham wrote: > >> On 29/03/17 15:35, Peter Kurrasch wrote: >> >>> In other words, what used to be a trust anchor is now no better at >>> establishing trust than the end-entity cert one is trying to validate or >>> investigate (for example, in a forensic context) in the first place. I >>> hardly think this redefinition of trust anchor improves the state of the >>> global PKI and I sincerely hope it does not become a trend. >>> >> >> The trouble is, you want to optimise the system for people who make >> individual personal trust decisions about individual roots. We would >> like to optimise it for ubiquitous minimum-DV encryption, which requires >> mechanisms permitting new market entrants on a timescale less than 5+ >> years. >> >> > That goal would be equally (in fact better) served by new market > entrants getting cross-signed by incumbents, like Let's encrypt did. > > Problem is that whenever viewing a full cert chain in a typical browser > etc. that has reference "trusted" copies of all the incumbents, > disassociating the names in root CA and SubCA certificates from reality > creates misinformation in a context displayed as being "fully > validated" to known traceable roots by the Browser/etc. > > For example, when doing ordinary browsing with https on-by-default, > users rarely bother checking the certificate beyond "the browser says > it is not a MitM attack, good". Except when visiting a high value > site, such as a government site to file a change in ownership of an > entire house (such sites DO exist). Then it makes sense to click on > the certificate user interface and check that the supposed "Government > Land Ownership Registry of the Kingdom of X" site is verified by > someone that could reasonably be trusted to do so (i.e. not a national > CA of the republic of Y or the semi-internal CA of some private > megacorp). > > With this recent transaction, the browser could show "GlobalSign" when > it should show "Google", two companies with very different security and > privacy reputations. One would expect a blogger/blogblog domain to > have a Google-issued certificate while one would expect the opposite of > anything hosted outside the Alphabet group. > > > > > Enjoy > > Jakob > -- > Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com > Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10 > This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors. > WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded > > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

