The 2017 ACES CP excluding anything other than citizen to E-gov breaks certain use cases that are outside the scope of Mozilla, but not from the standpoint of a fully functional commercial c=US structure which I have developed since 1996 since I reached an agreement with GSA on how to proceed after managing the c=US pilot and implementing X.509 for the National Labs in the Directory.
Specifically it blocks the development of a functional national patient and provider Directory structure in which relying parties require fully valid cross certified trust chains that was already developed with HHS. Invalid patient identity is at the heart of one of the leading causes of mortality in the US. Not reaching consensus on equipping end users with low cost affordable PKI in addition to browser security policy puts profit over human rights. The only rational reason I can see for such a policy is to MITM at will medical records under the 702 Authorities, since end user implementation of PKI based tecnology in an end to end manner precludes business level meddling and trust, replaced by the original Diffie concept. As we know this is already the policy of the IETF and IAB to encrypt everything. But the policy mapping between these different use cases is perhaps overly complex and certainly not user friendly. Also the Blue Button MU2 used ACES in their trust bundle at one point and I checked yesterday for medical providers that already attested to MU2 SMTP/SMIME compliance and received Federal money under the recovery stimulus package and that's not limited to just the VA but the VA has used this very effectively. Browsers of course don't typically implement bi-directional TLS authenticating the client which is very useful in use cases related to maintaining data integrity in disaster situations for logging. i checked the Identrust site and their ACES CP had poor user documentation with CP dated 2015. That's when I subsequently found your information which was up to date and very useful. I see that the only remaining bug issue was to drop the cross certificate so that Mozilla users could not incorrectly validate, _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

