With two exceptions (neither of which have the websites trust bit set),
all answers are now in from the April 2017 CA Communication. You can
find links to the answers here:
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Communications#April_2017_Responses

Some highlights for the community's attention:

* (Q1) It seems like all CAs are on track to implement domain validation
via one of the Ten Blessed Methods by July 21st 2017.

* (Q2) CAs are now required to increment the version number of their
CP/CPS every year, which will make it much easier to notice CAs who are
not regularly reviewing and revising their documentation.

* (Q3) A few CAs might have difficulty meeting the June 1st deadline for
CP/CPS in English. But of course, this may not be a problem unless their
audit becomes due before they've got it done.

* (Q5/Q6) There is some concern over the requirement to include the
words "clean" or "qualified" in audit reports, particularly for ETSI
audits. This is one for Kathleen to look at.

* (Q8) All 60 CAs confirm they have ceased publicly-trusted SHA-1 SSL
issuance :-)

* (Q9) DocuSign (and perhaps T-Systems; it's not clear) are the only CAs
of the 60 who say they have 3rd party RAs doing domain validation.

* (Q11) A number of CAs haven't answered this or seem not to have quite
understood the requirement. I sent some of them an email a week or two
ago; I may need to send another. But still, it's a good starting
collection of CAA identifiers. A surprisingly large number of CAs wish
to use more than one domain name. DigiCert's comment is amusing:

"digicert.com, although I may add misspellings of "Digicert" shortly. It
happens a lot."

* (Q13) Many CAs plan to stop issuing SHA-1 S/MIME by the end of this
year. CAs without a firm date are: Comodo, GlobalSign, SECOM, TWCA, and
Visa. A couple of these CAs hint that an industry deadline to stop would
help their customers see the need to migrate.

* (Q14) There is a surprising level of support for reducing certificate
lifetimes to 13 months. Here's my quick analysis:

YES             20
NO              21
MORE TIME       6
DV ONLY         4
N/A             4
UNKNOWN         4

The opposition group, though, contains many of the larger CAs (e.g.
Comodo, Entrust, Symantec). Let's Encrypt is in favour, and GoDaddy is
in the More Time camp. Most More Timers suggested March 2019 rather than
2018. A few CAs suggest reducing the lifetime for DV certs only.
"Unknown" means they gave an answer but didn't actually indicate a position!

Gerv
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