On 15/05/2017 14:07, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
On 2017-05-15 13:40, Gervase Markham wrote:
* (Q13) Many CAs plan to stop issuing SHA-1 S/MIME by the end of this
year. CAs without a firm date are: Comodo, GlobalSign, SECOM, TWCA, and
Visa. A couple of these CAs hint that an industry deadline to stop would
help their customers see the need to migrate.
So is this something we can work on?
I think Thunderbird probably doesn't have enough market share to
actually do something with this, so maybe this is more something for
Microsoft?
Indeed, I strongly suspect Microsoft *customers* combined with
Microsoft untrustworthiness (they officially closed their Trustworthy
Computing initiative!) may be the major hold out, specifically:
1. Microsoft's e-mail clients were very late to accept stronger
signature algorithms for e-mails (including e-mails sent by users of
non-problematic e-mail clients). I believe Globalsign's page about
SHA256-transition for customers provides a nice overview.
2. Microsoft has an insistent policy of not adding new algorithms to
existing products during the period where other software changes are
being provided for those products.
3. Since mid 2014, Microsoft has made it increasingly difficult for
their customers to separate useful software updates from those that
are so bad customers don't want them. This probably makes it
impossible for Microsoft to convince all their existing customers to
accept a crypto feature update if it was released now.
4. Because Microsoft e-mail clients are deeply integrated and bundled
with their larger software suites (Office, Windows, live.com),
upgrading to new versions is non-trivial due to the need for
compatibility elsewhere in those suites. For example if a time
billing system is dependent on integration with Word 2007, an entire
company may be stuck with Outlook 2007 long after they would have
routinely upgraded to a later version of Outlook as a pure standalone
e-mail client.
Also, in a situation similar to web servers versus web browsers, only
worse, e-mail senders need to use certificates and algorithms that are
accepted by all e-mail clients that may be in use by any and all
potential correspondents out there.
Enjoy
Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10
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