The content on example.com isn't important. An unauthorized certificate can
still potentially be used to intercept an HTTPS connection to example.com
and cause malicious behavior that is unrelated to the "real" content of
example.com.

I'm pushing on this because it's important to understand that a misissuance
like this is bad for more than just "compliance" reasons. It's the same
principle behind moving away from unencrypted connections generally -- even
"unimportant" sites benefit from the use of HTTPS, in part because it
closes off attack vectors that are present for all connections that fail to
treat the network as untrusted.

-- Eric

On Wed, May 31, 2017 at 8:48 PM, Yuhong Bao <[email protected]>
wrote:

> I don't think there is anything important on example.com though
> ________________________________________
> From: Eric Mill <[email protected]>
> Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2017 4:34:20 PM
> To: Jeremy Rowley
> Cc: Kurt Roeckx; Yuhong Bao; [email protected];
> Matthew Hardeman
> Subject: Re: StartCom issuing bogus certificates
>
> It's absolutely not harmless to use example.com<http://example.com> to
> test certificate issuance. People visit example.com<http://example.com>
> all the time, given its role. An unauthorized certificate for example.com<
> http://example.com> could let someone other than its owner hijack user
> connections, and maliciously redirect traffic or inject code/content, same
> as for any other online service people use. It's an actual security
> problem, not just a compliance violation.
>
> -- Eric
>
> On Wed, May 31, 2017 at 3:18 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy <
> [email protected]<mailto:dev-
> [email protected]>> wrote:
> Agreed - the license to use the domain granted by IANA is only for
> inclusion
> in documents (https://www.iana.org/domains/reserved). There isn't a
> license
> to use the domain for testing or any other purposes.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: dev-security-policy
> [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley<mailto:d
> ev-security-policy-bounces%2Bjeremy.rowley>[email protected]
> .org] On Behalf Of Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2017 11:55 AM
> To: Yuhong Bao <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
> >>
> Cc: [email protected]<mailto:mozil
> [email protected]>; Matthew Hardeman
> <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
> Subject: Re: StartCom issuing bogus certificates
>
> On Wed, May 31, 2017 at 05:09:57PM +0000, Yuhong Bao via
> dev-security-policy
> wrote:
> > The point is that "misissuance" of example.com<http://example.com> is
> harmless as they are
> reserved by IANA.
>
> But example.com<http://example.com> is a real domain that that even has
> an https website. The
> certificate is issued by digicert, and the subject says it's to ICANN. If
> the certificate is not requested by IANA or ICANN nobody should issue a
> certificate for it.
>
>
> Kurt
>
> _______________________________________________
> dev-security-policy mailing list
> [email protected]<mailto:dev-
> [email protected]>
> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
>
> _______________________________________________
> dev-security-policy mailing list
> [email protected]<mailto:dev-
> [email protected]>
> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
>
>
>
>
> --
> konklone.com<https://konklone.com> | @konklone<https://twitter.com/
> konklone>
>



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