Hi Inigo, You mentioned there would be a report attached but I believe you forgot to send it?
Can you upload the report and provide a URL? I believe that's the 'best practice' for sharing files here as it allows non-subscribers to access the file via the Google Groups archive. -Vincent On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 6:40 AM Inigo Barreira via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote: > Hi all, > > Firstly I´d like to apologize for not having answering before and for > posting an initial response that was not correct not accurate and not > related what it´s being discussed right now. It was my fault for not having > checked before with my team, which is in China and they are 6 hours ahead, > but was my first reaction when saw test in the SAN. So, sorry for this. > > In fact, the "issue" was due for implementing the CT log. Recently one > customer asked why we weren´t logging our certificates in the CT logs, > which > we were doing it but with some problems because of the great firewall. So, > we were talking with Primekey and provided a solution to implement in our > system. We did it yesterday and for checking it, we created those "fake" > certificates for testing, which were revoked inmediately. > Attached there´s a report in which we explain all that has happened. And > also some screenshots. > In this report also indicate what remeditation steps we´ve already done to > avoid these issues happen again in the future. > > We´ve also realized that the CRL generation didn´t work as supposed because > didn´t generate a new CRL when those certificates were revoked but in the > next update. We are dealing with Primekey to know what has happened. The > OCSP response instead was correct and showed the certificates as revoked. > > For some other comments/suggestions posted in this thread I´d like to say > that: > > - this incident is not related to the "real" issuance system through our > CMS > system in which all domains are verified > - these certs were issued and revoked inmediately as they were only for > testing. I know it wasn´t a good decission > - regarding my initial response for test URLs, those are going to be > generated under our own website, like valid.startcomca.com, > revoked.startcomca.com > - and for those other certs in crt.sh, those are revoked but there are four > that were not issued because the connection with the CT failed and for some > reason are showed in the crt.sh. We´re contacting Primekey to know what has > happened but it seems to be related with the Startcom log, which didn´t > logged it because it failed and google logs, which did it, so maybe is a > configuration issue. > > Best regards > > Iñigo Barreira > CEO > StartCom CA Limited > > > -----Original Message----- > From: dev-security-policy > [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+inigo=startcomca....@lists.mozilla.org > ] > On Behalf Of Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy > Sent: jueves, 1 de junio de 2017 10:27 > To: Yuhong Bao <[email protected]>; Eric Mill <[email protected]>; > Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]> > Cc: [email protected]; Kurt Roeckx > <[email protected]>; Matthew Hardeman <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: StartCom issuing bogus certificates > > On 01/06/17 01:48, Yuhong Bao wrote: > > I don't think there is anything important on example.com though > > How would you like it if a CA decided there was nothing important on your > website and so decided it was OK to misissue certificates for it? > > This requirement is a positive requirement ("must have validated domain > ownership or control by applicant"), not a negative requirement ("domain > must not have anything important on it"). > > Gerv > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > -- Vincent Lynch _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

