Hi Inigo,

You mentioned there would be a report attached but I believe you forgot to
send it?

Can you upload the report and provide a URL? I believe that's the 'best
practice' for sharing files here as it allows non-subscribers to access the
file via the Google Groups archive.

-Vincent

On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 6:40 AM Inigo Barreira via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> Firstly I´d like to apologize for not having answering before and for
> posting an initial response that was not correct not accurate and not
> related what it´s being discussed right now. It was my fault for not having
> checked before with my team, which is in China and they are 6 hours ahead,
> but was my first reaction when saw test in the SAN. So, sorry for this.
>
> In fact, the "issue" was due for implementing the CT log. Recently one
> customer asked why we weren´t logging our certificates in the CT logs,
> which
> we were doing it but with some problems because of the great firewall. So,
> we were talking with Primekey and provided a solution to implement in our
> system. We did it yesterday and for checking it, we created those "fake"
> certificates for testing, which were revoked inmediately.
> Attached there´s a report in which we explain all that has happened. And
> also some screenshots.
> In this report also indicate what remeditation steps we´ve already done to
> avoid these issues happen again in the future.
>
> We´ve also realized that the CRL generation didn´t work as supposed because
> didn´t generate a new CRL when those certificates were revoked  but in the
> next update. We are dealing with Primekey to know what has happened. The
> OCSP response instead was correct and showed the certificates as revoked.
>
> For some other comments/suggestions posted in this thread I´d like to say
> that:
>
> - this incident is not related to the "real" issuance system through our
> CMS
> system in which all domains are verified
> - these certs were issued and revoked inmediately as they were only for
> testing. I know it wasn´t a good decission
> - regarding my initial response for test URLs, those are going to be
> generated under our own website, like valid.startcomca.com,
> revoked.startcomca.com
> - and for those other certs in crt.sh, those are revoked but there are four
> that were not issued because the connection with the CT failed and for some
> reason are showed in the crt.sh. We´re contacting Primekey to know what has
> happened but it seems to be related with the Startcom log, which didn´t
> logged it because it failed and google logs, which did it, so maybe is a
> configuration issue.
>
> Best regards
>
> Iñigo Barreira
> CEO
> StartCom CA Limited
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: dev-security-policy
> [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+inigo=startcomca....@lists.mozilla.org
> ]
> On Behalf Of Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
> Sent: jueves, 1 de junio de 2017 10:27
> To: Yuhong Bao <[email protected]>; Eric Mill <[email protected]>;
> Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected]; Kurt Roeckx
> <[email protected]>; Matthew Hardeman <[email protected]>
> Subject: Re: StartCom issuing bogus certificates
>
> On 01/06/17 01:48, Yuhong Bao wrote:
> > I don't think there is anything important on example.com though
>
> How would you like it if a CA decided there was nothing important on your
> website and so decided it was OK to misissue certificates for it?
>
> This requirement is a positive requirement ("must have validated domain
> ownership or control by applicant"), not a negative requirement ("domain
> must not have anything important on it").
>
> Gerv
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-- 
Vincent Lynch
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