Hi
<https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8873408> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8873408 <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8873409> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8873409 these are the 2 documents I tried to upload to the list, these are now in the bug created by Gerv at <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1369359> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1369359 Best regards Iñigo Barreira CEO StartCom CA Limited From: Vincent Lynch [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: jueves, 1 de junio de 2017 14:46 To: Eric Mill <[email protected]>; Gervase Markham <[email protected]>; Inigo Barreira <[email protected]>; Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]>; Yuhong Bao <[email protected]> Cc: Kurt Roeckx <[email protected]>; Matthew Hardeman <[email protected]>; [email protected] Subject: Re: StartCom issuing bogus certificates Hi Inigo, You mentioned there would be a report attached but I believe you forgot to send it? Can you upload the report and provide a URL? I believe that's the 'best practice' for sharing files here as it allows non-subscribers to access the file via the Google Groups archive. -Vincent On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 6:40 AM Inigo Barreira via dev-security-policy <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Hi all, Firstly I´d like to apologize for not having answering before and for posting an initial response that was not correct not accurate and not related what it´s being discussed right now. It was my fault for not having checked before with my team, which is in China and they are 6 hours ahead, but was my first reaction when saw test in the SAN. So, sorry for this. In fact, the "issue" was due for implementing the CT log. Recently one customer asked why we weren´t logging our certificates in the CT logs, which we were doing it but with some problems because of the great firewall. So, we were talking with Primekey and provided a solution to implement in our system. We did it yesterday and for checking it, we created those "fake" certificates for testing, which were revoked inmediately. Attached there´s a report in which we explain all that has happened. And also some screenshots. In this report also indicate what remeditation steps we´ve already done to avoid these issues happen again in the future. We´ve also realized that the CRL generation didn´t work as supposed because didn´t generate a new CRL when those certificates were revoked but in the next update. We are dealing with Primekey to know what has happened. The OCSP response instead was correct and showed the certificates as revoked. For some other comments/suggestions posted in this thread I´d like to say that: - this incident is not related to the "real" issuance system through our CMS system in which all domains are verified - these certs were issued and revoked inmediately as they were only for testing. I know it wasn´t a good decission - regarding my initial response for test URLs, those are going to be generated under our own website, like valid.startcomca.com <http://valid.startcomca.com> , revoked.startcomca.com <http://revoked.startcomca.com> - and for those other certs in crt.sh, those are revoked but there are four that were not issued because the connection with the CT failed and for some reason are showed in the crt.sh. We´re contacting Primekey to know what has happened but it seems to be related with the Startcom log, which didn´t logged it because it failed and google logs, which did it, so maybe is a configuration issue. Best regards Iñigo Barreira CEO StartCom CA Limited -----Original Message----- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+inigo <mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces%2Binigo> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ] On Behalf Of Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy Sent: jueves, 1 de junio de 2017 10:27 To: Yuhong Bao <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >; Eric Mill <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >; Jeremy Rowley <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Cc: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ; Kurt Roeckx <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >; Matthew Hardeman <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: Re: StartCom issuing bogus certificates On 01/06/17 01:48, Yuhong Bao wrote: > I don't think there is anything important on example.com <http://example.com> > though How would you like it if a CA decided there was nothing important on your website and so decided it was OK to misissue certificates for it? This requirement is a positive requirement ("must have validated domain ownership or control by applicant"), not a negative requirement ("domain must not have anything important on it"). Gerv _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy -- Vincent Lynch
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