On Monday, 17 July 2017 16:22:22 UTC+1, Ben Wilson wrote: > Thank you for bringing this to our attention. We have contacted Intesa > Sanpaolo regarding this error and have asked them to correct it as soon as > possible.
"Correcting" the error is surely the smaller of the two tasks ahead. This CA is trusted in the Web PKI, and should have technical controls in place to ensure that subject details in any certificates issued are appropriately validated. There cannot possibly have been appropriate validation of this name, because it cannot exist in the Internet DNS. So that means at the very least the CA's technical controls are not effective in preventing issuance of certificates for names which weren't actually successfully validated. Of course in m.d.s.policy we aren't privy to details of exactly how the controls fall short, but it makes sense to err on the side of caution -- if certificates can be issued for www.intesasanpaolovita..biz then why not for www.google.com or any other name? I think it would be enlightening to see the records of how the names in this certificate were validated before issuance. I do not know if DigiCert samples or otherwise examines such records from Intesa Sanpaolo routinely, but it certainly would seem in order to look at them now. Since the subject of the leaf certificate is also Intesa Sanpaolo itself, this ought to be very easy to arrange. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

