> -----Original Message----- > From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy- > bounces+steve_medin=symantec....@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of > David E. Ross via dev-security-policy > Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2017 12:48 PM > To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org > Subject: Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal > > On 7/19/2017 8:31 AM, Steve Medin wrote: > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy- > >> bounces+steve_medin=symantec....@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of > >> Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy > >> Sent: Tuesday, July 18, 2017 4:39 PM > >> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org > >> Subject: Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal > >> > >> > >> Just for clarity: > >> > >> (Note: Using ISO date format instead of ambiguous local date format) > >> > >> How many Symantec certs issued prior to 2015-06-01 expire after > 2018- > >> 06-01, and how does that mesh with the alternative date proposed > >> below: > >> > >> On 18/07/2017 21:37, Steve Medin wrote: > >>> Correction: Summary item #3 should read: > >>> > >>> 3. May 1, 2018 > >>> a. Single date of distrust of certificates issued prior to 6/1/2016. > >> (changed from August 31,2017 for certificates issued prior to > >> 6/1/2015 and from January 18, 2018 for certificates issued prior to > 6/1/2016). > >>> > > > > Over 34,000 certificates were issued prior to 2015-06-01 and expire after > 2018-06-01. This is in addition to almost 200,000 certificates that would > also need to be replaced under the current SubCA proposal assuming a May > 1, 2018 distrust date. We believe that nine months (from August 1, 2017 to > May 1, 2018) is aggressive but achievable for this transition - a period > minimally necessary to allow for site operators to plan and execute an > orderly transition and to reduce the potential risk of widespread ecosystem > disruption. Nevertheless, we urge the community to consider moving the > proposed May 1, 2018 distrust date out even further to February 1, 2019 > in order to minimize the risk of end user disruption by ensuring that website > operators have a reasonable timeframe to plan and deploy replacement > certificates. > > > > It appears that Symantec wants to delay distrusting certificates until all > existing subscriber certificates reach their inherent expiration dates. >
Our proposed distrust date (May 1, 2018) is based on an aggressive but achievable period of time to allow impacted organizations the time needed to replace, test and operationalize replacement certificates in their infrastructure. More than 234,000 certificates are required to be replaced before their expiration dates assuming a distrust date of May 1, 2018. In fact, we urge the community to consider moving this distrust date out even further to February 1, 2019 in order to minimize the risk of end user disruption by ensuring that website operators have a reasonable timeframe to plan and deploy replacement certificates. This recommendation is echoed by our prospective Managed CA partners. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
