Given the rarity of such events, it will be hard for subscribers to
ensure they properly handle automated "renew prematurely" messages,
so other contact methods designed to reach human operators would often
be preferable.

But for fully automated "fire-and-forget" servers, I think the most
efficient way to do this would be as an Extended attribute in OCSP
responses, since at least some servers (and hopefully more in the
future) will be doing OCSP-stapling anyway.  The warning attribute would
contain a standard date field indicating a premature revocation
date/time in the future, and the (positive) OCSP response would also
expire at that time.  If no appropriate extended attribute exists, one
would be assigned out of the Enterprise OID-tree belonging to Let's
Encrypt, with a public statement that other CAs are free to use it with
the same documented semantics.

With a little ingenuity on the part of the CA, this can be readily
incorporated into pre-calculated OCSP responses (for single certificate
queries without a nonce).  The CA would need the general ability to roll
out a few updated OCSP responses outside its usual batch schedule, which
is also useful for speeding up regular revocations (for clients that
check OCSP).

On 11/08/2017 15:17, Alex Gaynor wrote:
This is a great point, re:automated issuance systems like ACME. I've
suggested to the Let's Encrypt folks the idea of a "should I re-issue"
endpoint that clients can poll. This would give CAs a programatic ability
to broadcast to subscribers that they should reissue now because the cert
is about to be revoked (or because they want to shift which SCTs are
embedded, or to indicate an appropriate renewal period for short lived
certs, or... turns out there are a lot of use case!) and then automatically
revoke at the end of the defined period.

Hopefully something useful comes out of that :-)

Alex

On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 7:11 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

Not really - most CAs reuse validation information for the time period
specified under the BRs, which is currently 825 days under section 4.2.1.
The hardest part of the whole process is typically contacting the customer
to start the replacement process. The problem is probably worse for fully
automated CAs who don't necessarily have a close relationship with the
customer, perhaps only an email address that can be used to let them know
their website is about to go down.

-----Original Message-----
From: dev-security-policy
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=
[email protected]
.org] On Behalf Of Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
Sent: Thursday, August 10, 2017 3:40 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Certificates with invalidly long serial numbers

But that would require the issuer of the replacement cert (which might not
be a fast-issue DV cert) to complete validation in something like 36 hours,
which is much shorter than the normal time taken to do proper OV and/or EV
validation.

I have previously suggested 14 days for live certificates that don't cause
actual security issues.  This would be enough for most subscribers to
either
get a reissued certificate (for free) from the original CA or set up an
account with a competing CA and get at least a basic OV cert.

On 10/08/2017 03:02, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
No objection to 72 hours v. 1 business day.  I agree it should be
short and
72 hours seems perfectly reasonable .

-----Original Message-----
From: dev-security-policy
[mailto:[email protected]
ozilla .org] On Behalf Of Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy
Sent: Wednesday, August 9, 2017 4:57 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Certificates with invalidly long serial numbers

On Wednesday, August 9, 2017 at 9:20:02 AM UTC-5, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
All CAS are required to maintain the capability to process and
receive
revocation requests 24x7 under the baseline requirements. The headache
is not with the CA. Rather, it's notifying the customer that their
certificate will be revoked before the start of the next business day.
Having a one to two business day rule  instead of 24 hours for non
compromise issues gives the end entity time to receive the
notification and replace their certificate with a compliant version.

I'm sure many customers would absolutely prefer that and on the
surface it does sound like a good solution. However, I think it's
another example of the general difference of opinion between people on
this list around whether we should be holding CAs to the highest
standards or not. These mis-issued certificates are typically not a
security concern, but they speak to either ignorance on the part of CA
operators or a pattern of lackadaisical controls within the issuance
systems. Neither of these is acceptable behavior at this juncture.
Conformance with the BRs has been mandatory for over 5 years now.
Customers need to be made aware of the failures of their chosen
providers and the responsibilities incumbent upon them as subscribers,
and if their own certificate installation/replacement processes are
sufficiently archaic as to make it difficult to replace a certificate
in an automated fashion then they should rectify that immediately.

That said, to continue the thought experiment, what does "1-2 business
days"
really mean?Does the CA get 1-2 business days followed by 1-2 for the
customer? What if there's a holiday in the CA's country of operations
followed by a holiday in the customer's home country? How quickly does
this window extend to 2+ weeks? If you were to go down this path I'd
strongly prefer it to be a hard deadline (e.g. 72 hours) and not
anything related to business days.


Enjoy

Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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