On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 4:53 AM, Stephen Davidson via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:
> Update on Siemens - Certificates with less than 64 bits of entropy > The following is regarding the topic https://groups.google.com/ > forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.security.policy/vl5eq0PoJxY regarding the > “Siemens Issuing CA Internet Server 2016” that is root signed by QuoVadis > and independently audited and disclosed. > > At the time the issue was reported, Siemens agreed to immediately take the > CA offline, and it remains offline pending resolution. This was reported > to the listserv by me on 7/20. > > Siemens confirmed a bug in their internally-developed CA software which > meant it was issuing TLS/SSL with 32bit serial numbers, although the serial > numbers were non sequential. Siemens informed their external auditors of > the situation. > > It was found that 1201 currently valid certificates chained to the > QuoVadis root were affected. An additional 137 currently valid > certificates were issued under the previous "Siemens Issuing CA Internet > 2013" chained to a Digicert root, noted in an email from Ben Wilson of > Digicert yesterday. In the case of the QuoVadis-chained certificates, the > certificates are virtually all of one year validity with expirations > balanced across the calendar months (there are a handful of two and three > year certificates, similar to the Digicert-chained population). The > remaining Digicert-chained certificates all expire by end of November > 2017. All certificates were issued to Siemens entities and > Siemens-controlled domains. > > Next steps > Siemens has moved to accelerate the previously planned replacement of > their existing inhouse CA platform with a well-known open source CA with > which QuoVadis is well familiar. QuoVadis and Siemens' auditors are > coordinating with Siemens to confirm that the new CA configuration meets > Baseline Requirements. It is worth noting that some BR controls, > particularly related to vetting, are imposed by the Siemens certificate > lifecycle system which will continue to be used with the new CA. Siemens > will not recommence their inhouse SSL issuance until the new CA is active > and confirmed compliant. The new CA is expected to come online in the > second week of September. Siemens commits to logging new SSL from that CA > in Certificate Transparency. > > Replacement > Although the Siemens PKI is centralised, the certificates are issued to a > wide variety of Siemens group companies around the world and are used on > both infrastructure and high traffic websites. A rushed revocation and > replacement of these certificates would have a negative business impact on > Siemens that they believe outweighs the risk of the lower serials entropy > (particularly given that they are nonsequential). > > We propose that Siemens begin the early replacement of the affected > certificates as soon as the new CA infrastructure is approved, with the > goal of completing the task by January 31, 2018. This will include all the > affected certificates (ie those chained from both the QuoVadis and Digicert > roots). While Siemens acknowledges that the affected certificates should > not have occurred, we point out that they will all be replaced far in > advance of the September 2019 date when industry-wide the last certificates > issued before the BR change (to larger serial numbers) are scheduled to > expire. > > We request that Siemens be allowed this expanded scope to conduct an > orderly replacement of the affected certificates. > > Many thanks, Stephen Davidson > QuoVadis Stephen, Thanks for posting your update regarding Siemens. Unfortunately, however, it's lacking in many critical details necessary to take appropriate next steps. On the positive side, it is good to see that QuoVadis immediately took (and kept) the Siemens CA offline. This represents a minimum necessary step when faced with misissuance from a subordinate, and is a step expected of all CAs while they investigate the issue and its causes, to prevent future misissuance. However, the assessment of what went wrong, what steps are being taken, and the risk are all deficient and, at worse, potentially demonstrate a misunderstanding of both the risk of these certificates and the purposes of these discussions. To understand an appropriate level of detail, and the set of questions that both QuoVadis and Siemens should be asking, I think a postmortem to the level of detail provided by PKIoverheid, in https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/vl5eq0PoJxY/W1D4oZ__BwAJ , is a _minimum_ necessary step to take. In particular, it's useful to understand 1) Siemens has maintained it was a "bug" that caused 32-bit serial numbers. However, it's unclear from the community whether or not Siemens actually took steps to appropriately implement the necessary controls - meaning it was a bug in process - or whether code was implemented, but the implementation was faulty - a bug in software. Including sufficient detail, by analyzing both the process and the software development methodology, is necessary to help the community both understand the nature of the "bug" and the processes that gave rise to it. 2) QuoVadis failed to detect these certificates from a sub-CA it is supervising. Why is this, and what steps is QuoVadis taking to properly oversee its independently-operated sub-CAs? 3) Given that this issue persisted in both the previous and present hierarchy, and given Siemens' limited issuance, why was this not detected by audits? Were the audits by a sufficiently technically skilled auditor? Did every certificate they sampled have an appropriately random serial number? How many certificates did they sample? 4) QuoVadis and Siemens have not disclosed all affected certificates. Can you please provide full details for all 1201 currently valid certificates, such as via CT? A separate document (e.g. spreadsheet) would be appropriate to contain all of the links to this. In short, the analysis by Siemens and QuoVadis fails to identify or address the systemic factors that lead to this failure, and as a consequence, restore little confidence in either Siemens' operation or QuoVadis'. Further, the analysis of the risk of serial numbers is either misguided or disingenuous. Serial number entropy represents a critical risk mitigation regarding hash collisions - its criticality is about ensuring it is in place at time of issuance, as once a certificate is issued, the harm has been introduced. Thus, it's both inappropriate and unrelated to suggest that other legacy certificates with inappropriate entropy exist - those were issued in a earlier time - and what is relevant is when the process was introduced, how long it happened, and when it stopped. It's worth noting that Siemens made a design and business decision to use an in-house CA, and apparently made a series of design and business decisions that failed to oversee or detect this issue. Similarly, QuoVadis, despite having tools available to monitor and supervise issuance, appears to have failed to detect these issues. The impact that revoking these certificate has can thus be argued to be through the decisions of Siemens and QuoVadis, rather than the community, and thus appropriate to suggest that the cost of this impact should be borne by Siemens and QuoVadis. Further, it's worth noting that, given the future risk of further non-compliance, it's not unreasonable to suggest that Siemens should absolutely be prepared to replace all 1201 currently valid certificates within 24 hours, or, at most, a week, rather than the nearly five months being proposed here. In 2017, it is no longer defensible to suggest an organization may need that long to replace its certificates - and if it is, that represents a series of design and business decisions made over the past several years that have ignored both modern deployment practices and the changing nature of the ecosystem. It should not be the role of CAs, or the Mozilla community, to prop up these parts of the ecosystem, which need to support evolving to address the continued threats and necessary ecosystem improvements. As the Baseline Requirements require revocation of the subscriber certificates within 24 hours (4.9.1.1 (4), (9), (15)), which Siemens has not done, and the Baseline Requirements require revocation of the subordinate CA certificate within 7 days (4.9.1.2 (5)), which QuoVadis has not done, it's expected that both Siemens and QuoVadis will present qualified audits during the next audit period due to knowing and intentional violation of the requirements. The effect these qualifications have on the continued trust status of past certificates, and the continued recognition of future certificates, is predicated on the ability to provide sufficient assurance that the systemic issues have been identified, understood, and remediated. At present, this response does not indicate a sufficient level of disclosure to make that conclusion. Timely and immediate revocation is one step that can be taken to restore that confidence, while similarly, a full, holistic, and detailed response may help mitigate the damage to trust that this misissuance has done. For examples of what might be considered positive and appropriate responses, and demonstrates the CAs' awareness and understanding of the issues: - Let's Encrypt - https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/may-19-2017-ocsp-and-issuance-outage-postmortem/34922 - PKIoverheid - https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/vl5eq0PoJxY/W1D4oZ__BwAJ You can also consider post-mortems from related parts, such as CT logs, as seen in Venafi's CT log post-mortem at https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/ct-policy/ohtZ64gLN3I/namq_NDmAQAJ _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

