Thanks Ryan, and I note your further posting regarding prompt response.  Noting 
your desire for detail, I have hesitated to respond with partial answers as 
both Siemens and QuoVadis are working hard to fix the issues with the Siemens 
CA and to replace the certificates as quickly as possible.

However, I don’t wish to delay getting more information to you, and ask for 
your patience if complete information comes in iterations.

Siemens has previously indicated that the affected certificates are installed 
on high profile websites and infrastructure for Siemen’s group companies around 
the world, and that a rushed revocation would create more damage than could be 
expected from the serial number noncompliance.  

We have been working with Siemens to dramatically advance the date by which the 
affected certificates can be replaced and revoked.  Siemens predicts that the 
vast majority of the certificates can be replaced by September 30, 2017 with 
the few difficult cases following.

Addressing your questions:
1)      The failure was one of process rather than deployed code.  QuoVadis 
made an indepth review of the Siemens CA, policies and practices when we took 
over the rootsigning, just before the BR changes which raised the serial 
entropy requirements.  At that time it was compliant.   QuoVadis formally 
updates Siemens on changes to applicable standards, and the Siemens PKI team 
independently monitors groups like the CABF public and m.d.s.p. lists. Siemens 
were aware of the pending change to 64-bit serials and were prepared to 
implement them.  

I note that at the same time planning was underway to move from the in-house CA 
to an OSS CA – precisely for the reason of easing compliance with the 
increasing pace of change in technical aspects of the BR and other standards, 
such as CT, CAA and serial entropy.  It appears that by oversight, the update 
to bring the inhouse CA to 64-bits was not deployed, and our expectation was 
that the check would be made in the external audit.  The long transition to the 
OSS CA is close to completion.

2)      QuoVadis has a dedicated head of compliance and risk management who, in 
addition to overseeing QuoVadis’ own measures, supervises its external sub-CAs 
including detailed discussions on evolving standards, checks on 
implementations, as well as ongoing monitoring of certificate issuance.  There 
is frequent communication with Siemens and our other root-signed customers.

Siemens has a significant and mature internal audit and external audit regime.  
QuoVadis placed too much reliance on the external ETSI TS 102042 V2.4.1 NCP+ 
DVCP/OVCP audit report for what should have been textbook issues like the 
serial number entropy.  Going forward, QuoVadis will increase the formality of 
notifications regarding BR approved ballots, requiring documented evidence of 
compliance by the effective date, and notification to auditors for scope.

Like many CAs, QuoVadis uses crt.sh/certlint to check certificate issuance 
including for external sub-CAs.  This perhaps led to a false sense of security, 
as certlint does not highlight issues with serial number entropy.  Moreover, 
the fleeting window of visibility in some crt.sh reports may not reveal older 
issues or certificates that have not appeared in CT. QuoVadis is introducing 
routine use of certlint in its own certificate management system, and will 
build an expanded view for our external subCAs (the new Siemens CA will log all 
SSL in CT, and we intend our other external sub-CAs to do so before the Google 
deadline).  

3)      I do not have sufficient information yet to answer your questions 
regarding the auditor’s practices, and cannot comment on Digicert’s (nor 
Verizon’s) previous practices.

4)      The list of affected certificates is attached in spreadsheet form;  
they will be uploaded to CT as well.  You will note that the number has 
declined – Siemens' previous report did not take into account that some of the 
certificates had already previously been revoked for other reasons.   The 
spreadsheet also includes certificates issued during the Digicert/Verizon root 
signing period.

Regards, Stephen

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