What I dislike about this particular rationale is that I presupposes we
should architect web security such as to avoid enhancements which have
value to anyone the least common denominator.

Is the average user (actually, the bottom rung of the concentration of
values around the average, I suppose) the only user our interfaces should
target?

On Mon, Dec 11, 2017 at 5:21 PM, Hanno Böck via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
>
> I support the removal of special treatments and UI for EV
> certificates.
>
> Rationale: I believe plenty of security research shows that it is
> incredibly hard to communicate security indicators to users. If you ask
> average users about the meaning of green locks, green URL bars or
> anything else they will usually not know what it means.
>
>
What I dislike about this particular rationale is that it presupposes that
we should architect web security such as to avoid enhancements which have
value to anyone beyond the least common denominator.

Is the average user (actually, the bottom rung of the concentration of
values around the average, I suppose) the only user our interfaces should
target?
_______________________________________________
dev-security-policy mailing list
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Reply via email to