On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 7:45 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

> On 12/12/2017 19:39, Wayne Thayer wrote:
>
>> The outcome to be avoided is a CA that holds in escrow thousands of
>> private keys used for TLS. I don’t think that a policy permitting a CA to
>> generate the key pair is bad as long as the CA doesn’t hold on to the key
>> (unless  the certificate was issued to the CA or the CA is hosting the
>> site).
>>
>> What if the policy were to allow CA key generation but require the CA to
>> deliver the private key to the Subscriber and destroy the CA’s copy prior
>> to issuing a certificate? Would that make key generation easier? Tim, some
>> examples describing how this might be used would be helpful here.
>>
>>
> That would conflict with delivery in PKCS#12 format or any other format
> that delivers the key and certificate together, as users of such
> services commonly expect.
>
> Yes, it would. But it's a clear policy. If the requirement is to deliver
the key at the same time as the certificate, then how long can the CA hold
the private key?



> It would also conflict with keeping the issuing CA key far removed from
> public web interfaces, such as the interface used by users to pick up
> their key and certificate, even if separate, as it would not be fun to
> have to log in twice with 1 hour in between (once to pick up key, then
> once again to pick up certificate).
>
> I don't think I understand this use case, or how the proposed policy
relates to the issuing CA.


> It would only really work with a CSR+key generation service where the
> user receives the key at application time, then the cert after vetting.
> And many end systems cannot easily import that.
>
> Many commercial CAs could accommodate a workflow where they deliver the
private key at application time. Maybe you are thinking of IOT scenarios?
Again, some use cases describing the problem would be helpful.


> A policy allowing CAs to generate key pairs should also include provisions
>> for:
>> - The CA must generate the key in accordance with technical best practices
>> - While in possession of the private key, the CA must store it securely
>>
>> Wayne
>>
>>
>
> Enjoy
>
> Jakob
> --
> Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
> Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
> This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
> WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
>
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