Daymion,

(Apologies in advance if I've missed something that led to these results. These 
results rely on the crt.sh database, which I will admit to being less familiar 
with than I would like.)

While recently looking at some randomly selected recent certificates from this 
CA: https://crt.sh/?CAID=904, I noticed that it seemed that all had serial 
numbers with the high bit set. This being unlikely, I took advantage of the 
fact that crt.sh allows direct database access to get some more data - and it 
looks like for several days, the certificates logged did indeed have the high 
bit set in the serial number.

For certificates with a notBefore of 2019-03-07 22:52:51 to 2019-03-13 
02:01:15, it appears that all certificates had a serial number with the high 
bit set; there are a little under 100,000 entries in the crt.sh database with 
notBefore between those dates, all appear to be encoded to 9 bytes and with the 
high bit set.

For certificates with notBefore of 2019-03-13 02:01:16 and later, it appears 
that the distribution returns to what would be expected based on the selection 
criteria described.

The odds of this happening by random chance being extremely remote - this seems 
to indicate that there may have been an issue (and a loss of entropy).

The data was pulled from the public crt.sh database, one day at a time, using 
the following query:

select
  c.id,
  x509_notBefore(c.CERTIFICATE),
  x509_serialNumber(c.CERTIFICATE)
from certificate c
where
  c.issuer_ca_id = 904
  and x509_notBefore(c.CERTIFICATE) between '2019-03-08'::date and 
'2019-03-09'::date
limit 100000;

On Wednesday, March 13, 2019 at 8:17:00 PM UTC-4, Daymion Reynolds wrote:

> In accordance with our conversations to date, prior to 3/7 6:30pm AZ we 
> utilized raw 64 bit output from CSPRING, with uniqueness and non zero checks. 
> This new understanding of the rules calls for us to modify our original 
> disclosure to 0 affected certificates.

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