Rob,

I'm sure you provided this info somewhere, but I can't figure our where the
new summary table (named serial_number_entropy_20190325) is located.  Is it
somewhere on your Google Doc, or somewhere else?

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1K96XkOFYaCIYOdUKokwTZfPWALWmDed7znjC
Fn6lKoc/edit#gid=1093195185



-----Original Message-----
From: dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy-boun...@lists.mozilla.org> On
Behalf Of Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 6:16 PM
To: Hector Martin 'marcan' <mar...@marcan.st>;
mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Cc: Kurt Roeckx <k...@roeckx.be>
Subject: Re: Survey of (potentially noncompliant) Serial Number Lengths

On 18/03/2019 21:11, Hector Martin 'marcan' wrote:
> On 19/03/2019 02.17, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy wrote:
>> On 18/03/2019 17:05, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
>>> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 03:30:37PM +0000, Rob Stradling via
dev-security-policy wrote:
>>>>
>>>> When a value in column E is 100%, this is pretty solid evidence of 
>>>> noncompliance with BR 7.1.
>>>> When the values in column E and G are both approximately 50%, this 
>>>> suggests (but does not prove) that the CA is handling the output 
>>>> from their CSPRNG correctly.
>>>
>>> Sould F/G say >= 64, instead of > 64?
>>
>> Yes.  Fixed.  Thanks!
> 
> Perhaps it would make sense to separate out <64, ==64, >64?
> 
> 100% "64-bit" serial numbers would indicate an algorithm using 63 bits 
> of entropy and the top bit coerced to 1.

Even better than that (and many thanks to Andrew Ayer for suggesting this
idea)...

To enable folks to do more thorough statistical analysis, I've produced
another, richer summary table (named serial_number_entropy_20190325) on the
crt.sh DB where each row contains...
- the CA ID.
- a count of the total number of unique serial numbers.
- 160 counts, representing the number of times a given serial number bit is
1.  (Serial numbers of <20 octets were left-padded with 0x00 bytes).

This report covers all serial numbers in certs known to crt.sh where:
- there is an unrevoked serverAuthentication trust path to a Mozilla
built-in root.
- the notBefore date is between 2018-04-01 and 2019-02-22.

Duplicate serial numbers (i.e., precertificate/certificate pairs) are
deduplicated.

--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
Sectigo Limited
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