For everyone's reference, here is a link to the old thread:
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/wnuKAhACo3E/ujxPTWTlCQAJ

To be clear, the Kazakhstan government CA's root inclusion request
referenced in that thread was denied:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1232689#c11

However, a bug has been filed proposing to blocklist the current, untrusted
CA certificate being used by the Kazakhstan government:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1567114

In reading through the old thread, consensus seemed to be that blocklisting
this CA certificate isn't a good idea.

The old thread mentions the idea of adding a visual indicator to Firefox
when a root that is not included in our default root store is being used.
Somewhat coincidentally, this was added in Firefox 68:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1549605

Finally, I'll point out that Firefox implements public key pinning via a
preloaded list of sites, so the reported MITM will fail for those:
https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Public_Key_Pinning#Implementation_status

- Wayne



On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 8:55 AM starosekpd--- via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

> Sorry for bumping this old thread, but the Government of Kazakhstan has
> already started to use the certificate for MITM. Some information in news
> (on Russian):
>
> https://tengrinews.kz/internet/spetsialnyiy-sertifikat-poprosili-ustanovit-smartfonyi-374216/
>
> https://tengrinews.kz/internet/problemyi-dostupom-internetu-mogut-poyavitsya-astanchan-374068/
>
> https://www.nur.kz/1805169-problemy-s-dostupom-k-internetu-mogut-poavitsa-u-zitelej-nur-sultana.html
>
> Our internet providers via SMS inform us about the need to install this
> certificate that can be downloaded from their websites:
> http://qca.kz
> https://www.kcell.kz/ru/product/3585/658
>
> https://www.beeline.kz/almatinskaya-obl/about/press-center/press/news/details/sertifikat-bezopasnosti/
>
> Just to note, this certificate is not the same with the one that was
> published in this thread. Current one is issued by "Qaznet Trust
> Network"/"Security Certificate".
>
> At the moment, providers started to use the certificate in the capital of
> Kazakhstan - Nur-Sultan (ex. Astana).
>
> Did Mozilla have any way to prevent such attacks?
>
> --
> Thanks,
> Pavel
> _______________________________________________
> dev-security-policy mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
>
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