On Tuesday, July 23, 2019 at 7:34:11 AM UTC+4, Matthew Hardeman wrote:

> It is an interesting question.  It essentially becomes a gamble on whether
> they'll back down or just fork their own KazakhFox.  But if they do push
> this all the way with a national browser, then their people are even
> further worse off.

Pardon my broken English. I will be referring to "totalitarian governments" in 
general, not naming a specific country (countries) to be one.

I plea that doing nothing or implementing an easily dismissable warning will be 
an equivalent of a green light for mass-scale government-sanctioned MiTMs and 
further political persecutions based on the collected data. While a ban of the 
CA will be a warning for any totalitarian state that such measures have a 
hidden cost and complications that they are not ready to take - even if they 
will make a "TruthFox" and it will turn out to be less secure, the only added 
risk on top of it will be a slight increase of a chance of a trojan infection.

We know that MiTM is not just blocking access - MiTM also means collection of 
information. Between staying free/alive and a not working hard drive (or loss 
of personal data/money that is not comparable to a lengthy prison sentence with 
a criminal record or a *loss of life*) everyone will chose the first, not the 
second - ergo, the end user will be harmed more if no action/insufficient 
action is taken.

With all due respect, all theoretical measures that a totalitarian government 
might take to negate CA ban in all major browsers will require them to spent 
*even more resources* and complicate the spying process even further. Speaking 
generally, corrupt governments like to spent resources "on security", but will 
become rather stingy when it will turn out that a significant sum of money will 
be spent out of their pockets. In turn, it will lead to pushing all of the 
support on third parties while increasing the levels of corruption, 
miscommunication, non-compliance and etc., breaking the process down and 
postponing it/cancelling it entirely. Since all of that can not be done 
instantly, all of this will happen on the background of increasing civil 
unrest, where the totalitarian government's actions will be to blame to 
"messing with the internet" and the suffering from it commercial sector will be 
very active in lobbying for the repeal of the law.

I believe that the Russian anti-blogger law of 2014 has practically fallen 
apart in 2017 exactly due to a non-compliance of foreign parties and a feeble 
implementation in general - such a thing wouldn't happen if major social 
platforms didn't treat it as a slight and easily ignorable nuisance.

I ask everyone opposing taking drastic measures to reconsider - it's not the 
time to worry about the market share of the browser, comparing it to legitimate 
activities of a commercial sector or thinking of all theoretical ways the 
government might defeat the taken measures. Today is Kazakhstan, tomorrow - 
Russia (I believe we almost did the similar thing too, but it was thrown away 
due to encryption licensing complications - don't quote me on that, I haven't 
checked updates on this topic), the day after it might be your country 
(remember all proposals (or even the accepted laws) against encryption in major 
Western countries). Even little "sticks in the wheel" help and warn everybody 
else against doing the same.
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