Thanks, Pekka"Your comment is  again full of inaccurate claims and accusations 
without any evidence."I understand your frustration - we have different 
knowledge what Telia Company AB is - unfortunately you are limited to ownership 
and company reports, but the reality is completely different."This conversation 
is about Telia CA Root application to Mozilla and your unclear SK/Eidas/QS 
comments are not related to this at all."Correct, in my last comment I 
responded to Ryan's questions. Don't mix this up with my previous comment about 
Telia Finland Oyj's Root inclusion request, ok?"Telia Company AB is by no means 
any "high risk" applicant."Quoting out of context is one well known methods. If 
you read carefully, I explained why this is a high risk 
application."Semi-government company": Telia Company is a normal private 
company".Semi-government means a hibrid entity partly owned by Government 
(~40%).https://www.teliacompany.com/en/investors/share-related-information/shareholdings/"CA
 Resources have been clearly identified above to be located in Finnish "Telia 
Finland Oyj" and in Swedish "Cygate AB".Sorry, could you point us to specific 
URL's with page numbers?"Auditors have audited all related CA operations 
annually based on publicly disclosed Telia CP/CPS.""all related CA operations" 
is not sufficient: as noted earlier, its not clear which legal entity is the CA 
- the references I provided were on behalf of Telia Company AB, however 
applicant of this request is Telia Finland Oyj - from CA operations point of 
view these should be two different (independent) entities (no matter who owns 
what).Besides, we don't know which  [parts of CPS] constitute the CP. If you 
disclose this clearly, then we'll see what criteria  auditors have  
checked."Audit scope in audit reports has been legal entity "Telia Company AB 
(Telia)" that is the main company. This audit scope covers both mentioned 
affiliate legal entities practically participating into Telia CA processes."But 
we need audit reports issued to Telia Finland Oyj, which should be the only 
"main company". We don't care who owns Telia Finland Oyj unless the CA shares 
its operational resources with third parties (including owners). In all other 
cases, let's forget about Telia Company AB. :)"We can ask auditors to add all 
three company names in the future audit reports if it makes audit results 
clearer."I'm afraid this is misunderstanding - the CA under this request should 
be a clearly disclosed legal entity (ownership is out of scope here). If the CA 
operations rely on other party's (e.g. owner's, affiliate's etc.) material or 
human resources, you need to disclose those shared resources and have auditors 
do appropriate check ups. If this information already exist, please give us  
specific references."I think the used audit criteria and locations (Finland and 
Sweden) are clearly stated in the audit reports."OK, if you think so, just 
indicate specific audit report pages.Thanks,M.D.Sent from my Galaxy
-------- Original message --------From: "[email protected]" 
<[email protected]> Date: 1/4/22  08:50  (GMT+02:00) To: 
[email protected] Cc: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>, 
"[email protected]" <[email protected]>, 
"[email protected]" <[email protected]>, 
"[email protected]" <[email protected]>, Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]> 
Subject: Re: FW: RE: Public Discussion: Inclusion of Telia Root CA v2 Your 
comment is  again full of inaccurate claims and accusations without any 
evidence. Again: SK ID Solutions is not an affiliate of Telia Company AB (check 
annual report that is listing affiliates). Telia CA has nothing to do with 
them. This conversation is about Telia CA Root application to Mozilla and your 
unclear SK/Eidas/QS comments are not related to this at all. I wonder how long 
this kind of hostile discussion is tolerated by Mozilla.-"High Risk": Telia 
Company AB is by no means any "high risk" applicant. Telia CA has been a normal 
Root CA already more than 15 years without any security related issues in any 
of annual audit results. All BR rules have been followed during that time. Only 
minor technical deviations have ever been identified. Recently Telia also 
joined to CAB Forum work also.-"Semi-government company": Telia Company is a 
normal private company. Check https://www.teliacompany.com/en: Founded in 1853. 
The share is listed at Nasdaq Stockholm and Nasdaq Helsinki. Approximately 
490,000 shareholders. 20,800 employees. Net sales SEK 89,191 million.-"The 
problem here is that the CA resources need to be clearly identified and 
audited": CA Resources have been clearly identified above to be located in 
Finnish "Telia Finland Oyj" and in Swedish "Cygate AB". The full CA 
organization and system has been audited annually in both countries and in both 
companies. Auditors have got exact person details who belong to Telia CA and 
audit has been focused on those persons and their legal entities and how they 
implement Telia CA.-"the discussion is about CA operations not ownership"I 
agree. Auditors have audited all related CA operations annually based on 
publicly disclosed Telia CP/CPS.-"the subject of audit should be a legal 
entity, not a country"Audit scope in audit reports has been legal entity "Telia 
Company AB (Telia)" that is the main company. This audit scope covers both 
mentioned affiliate legal entities practically participating into Telia CA 
processes.-"CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements Audit Report 2021 (15 
pages). In this report there is no reference to Telia Finland Oyj."In audit 
reports there is reference to main company "Telia Company AB" because auditors 
kept it as better because Telia CA functions are carried by both affiliates: 
"Telia Finland Oyj" and "Cygate AB". We can ask auditors to add all three 
company names in the future audit reports if it makes audit results 
clearer.-"Telia Public Response to Audit 2021, In this single page document no 
reference to Telia Company AB or Telia Finland Oyj."Incorrect, footer has 
identification of entity that created this response which is: Telia Finland 
Oyj-"Mozilla policy requires clear indication of which audit criteria were 
checked (or not checked) at each location" - as you don’t have a CP and the 
relevant parts are not identified in the CP/CPS, its unclear what criteria you 
are talking about."I don't understand. We have CP (combined CP/CPS) that 
identifies the legal entities. I think the used audit criteria and locations 
(Finland and Sweden) are clearly stated in the audit reports. Both locations 
were using the same criteria. For WTCA criteria it is clearly written there 
"...in accordance with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certificate 
Authorities v2.2.1." and for WTBR is using "...in accordance with the WebTrust 
Principles and Criteria for Certificate Authorities - SSL Baseline with Network 
Security v2.4.1."    maanantai 3. tammikuuta 2022 klo 18.38.08 UTC+2 
[email protected] kirjoitti:1. RE "recent eIDAS & GDPR misimplementation chaos 
started"1.1 misimplementation means an instance of applying something 
incorrectly1.1.1 instance means a data object that Telia's affiliates - SK ID 
Solutions (formerly AS Sertifitseerimeskeskus)  together with its RA - Omnitel 
(legal name - AB Telia Lietuva) have been issuing to the public as "qualified 
certificate" (QS).1.1.2 something means "Qualified certificate" - a complex 
data structure that was initially defined in directive 1999/93/EC. For clarity, 
the QS in 1.1.1 (which is incompatible with the directive) is called surrogate 
QS.1.1.3 Worth mentioning also evaluation of legality of surrogate QS by:a) the 
Data Protection Authority (legal name Valstybinė duomenų apsaugos inspekcija - 
VDAI) ordered Omnitel to stop issuing surrogate QSs. This order is still 
ignored (how and why can be discussed separately);b) the Supreme administrative 
court which ruled that surrogate QS violates the Data protection law (an 
implementation of directive 95/46/EC, now regulation 2016/679 - GDPR). This is 
also ignored (how and why can be discussed separately).See case translation 
here: https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/download/2142/2072/1.1.4 based 
on the above, misimplementation of directive 1999/93/EC means incorrect 
application of Article 2 (10) (and Article 8 and Annex I). For technical 
details see the surrogate QC profiles here: 
https://www.skidsolutions.eu/en/repository/CPS/1.1.5 the regulation 910/2014 
(eIDAS) enhances and expands the acquis of  Directive 1999/93/EB - its 
transitional measure (Article 51 (2)) provision the conditions for the 
recognition of QSs (issued according to directive 1999/93/EC) as qualified 
electronic signature certificates (QESC) under eIDAS.1.1.6 the fact that SK ID 
Solutions together with its unaudited RA - AB Telia Lietuva:a) within 
transitional period issued surrogate QSs only, means incorrect application of 
eIDAS Article 51;b) after transitional period have been issuing surrogate QSs 
only, means incorrect application of eIDAS Article 28 (1) - (3).1.1.7 based on 
the above, misimplementation of eIDAS means incorrect application of Article 5, 
28 (1) - (2) and 51 (2).1.2 chaos means complete confusion and disorder1.2.1 
when surrogate QCs are accepted as QESCs, it is confusion.1.2.2 eIDAS has at 
least three directly applicable mechanisms to prevent issuing surrogate QCs, 
but none of them worked as expected (disorder):a) TSP audit by CAB - surrogate 
QCs were accepted;b) TSP "qualified service" assessment by the Supervisory body 
- surrogate QCs were accepted;c) Trust list management by the Scheme operator 
under the Commission implementing decision 2015/1505 - surrogate QCs were 
accepted.2. RE "This sounds like you're specifically referring to actions taken 
by Telia Company AB"Correct. Telia Company AB is the driving force of an 
”organized group”, wherea) The Swedish government creates "favorable 
conditions" in the countries of Telia Company AB's business operation (at least 
easy access to local governments is guaranteed);b) The Telia Company AB 
management partners with local governments so that the doors of relevant 
institutions (agencies) are open to its local affiliate  (remember "What's good 
for General Motors is good for the 
country"?)https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=10156465065383408&id=96251623407&m_entstream_source=video_home&player_suborigin=entry_point&player_format=permalinkc)
 The Telia Company AB affiliate develops "special relationship" with the  
institutions so that at least supervision of its business is completely 
"switched off", this includes lobbying any desired legislation (surrogate QC is 
"locally legitimazed" despite of competing with other national laws and EU 
directives and regulations.I must apologize for this schematic/simplified 
response covering 20+ years of Telia Company AB's business practices in 
Baltics.If you google "Telia + corruption", almost all information will be 
about Telia Company AB's (formerly TeliaSonera AB) "achievements" in teleco 
markets, this is partly because of:- its huge propaganda machine on mass media 
and social networks;- private embassy in Brussels, e. g. see 
https://www.linkedin.com/posts/skaitmeninio-sertifikavimo-centras_why-we-have-the-eidas-gdpr-misimplementation-activity-6747690541766504448-iYsc-
 naturally invisible/hard to understand trust services.Please let me know if 
you need more info or have any questions - the information above is backed by 
publicly acessible evidence material from official sources.Thanks,M.D.Sent from 
my Galaxy-------- Original message --------From: Moudrick Dadashov 
<[email protected]> Date: 12/30/21  17:34  (GMT+02:00) To: [email protected] 
Cc: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>, 
"[email protected]" <[email protected]>, "[email protected]" 
<[email protected]> Subject: Re: FW: RE: Public Discussion: Inclusion of Telia Root 
CA v2 Sure, Ryan, allow me 2-3 days as I’m fully booked by my grandchildren 
:)Thanks,M.D.On Thu, Dec 30, 2021, 06:00 Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]> 
wrote:On Wed, Dec 29, 2021 at 9:33 AM Moudrick M. Dadashov 
<[email protected]> wrote:If approved, this request will create a precedent 
of ”do like Telia” - a practice that is widely used by Telia Company AB and its 
affiliates in the trust services markets under eIDAS. That’s how the recent 
eIDAS & GDPR misimplementation chaos started.I suggest this request be approved 
after the conversion of corporate relationships into clearly identified, 
disclosed and audited specific PKI participant roles.Moudrick,For those 
following, could you share more precise details (e.g. references to news 
articles or other discussions) about the "recent eIDAS & GDPR misimplementation 
chaos started"? This sounds like you're specifically referring to actions taken 
by Telia Company AB, and perhaps some more context/references would help 
understand your concern. 




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