Boris Zbarsky: > > Could maybe try to brute-force the old key until they come up with a forged > certificate that an SSL library accepts?
No, not really. It requires the possession of the certificate with the weak key signed by a CA. > The whole point is that all the weak > keys come from a limited keyspace, right? That's correct. This allows to find the ~100,000 possible keys per key size the right one. > > Who said anything about "Mozilla" knowing? The idea here would be to have the > browser detect it and refuse to go to the site or something; no need to > communicate anything to "Mozilla". > Oh, that would technically not be possible I guess. Searching for such keys "dynamically" could take hours per key, hence previously created keys are used. They would need to be hosted somewhere and compared to. That's why Mozilla would know about which public key was used (the least). > > The premise (and a not unreasonable one) is that such a list can be generated > if > needed. > I expect that Mozilla will not come up with the resources for it. Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. <http://www.startcom.org> Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <xmpp:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Blog: Join the Revolution! <http://blog.startcom.org> Phone: +1.213.341.0390 _______________________________________________ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security
