On Wednesday, 14 August 2013 12:03:22 UTC+3, Kevin Chadwick wrote: > > Say you have an HTTPS bookmark to your bank. You visit it (your techie > > friend told you "always use this bookmark for your bank, and you'll be > > safe"), > > So now you trust a user writable reference over a non writable installed > CA crt (I hope soon to be replaced by website provided keys signed by > mozilla/Google)
Are you trying to say that there is a meaningful class of attacks that can modify user's bookmark store and still not be able to install additional plugins, add-ons or browser extensions? Perhaps the attacker does not have a local exploit to edit keys saved in the system but he can pretty much always divert the browser to use other stuff. Notice that all(?) browsers also allow adding additional CAs by the user... -- Mikko _______________________________________________ dev-security mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security
